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ABSTRACT 
  If any area of constitutional law has been defined by a metaphor, 
the First Amendment is the area, and the “marketplace of ideas” is the 
metaphor. Ever since Justice Holmes invoked the concept in his 
Abrams dissent, academic and popular understandings of the First 
Amendment have embraced the notion that free speech, like the free 
market, creates a competitive environment in which the best ideas 
ultimately prevail. But as with the free market for goods and services, 
there are discontents who point to the market failures that make the 
marketplace metaphor aspirational at best, and inequitable at worst. 
  Defenders of the free economic market have responded to these 
criticisms by developing a thicker understanding of how the market 
actually functions. Their most successful model is the New 
Institutional Economics, which incorporates and explains the 
transaction costs and institutions that populate and effectively regulate 
that market. The marketplace of ideas model, however, remains 
faithfully wedded to a neoclassical view that depends on a perfectly 
costless and efficient exchange of ideas. It is thus vulnerable to the 
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same criticisms economists answered decades ago, and it fails to take 
into account the rich view of market mechanisms and institutions they 
have developed since. First Amendment scholars led by Frederick 
Schauer have begun to lay the groundwork for a solution by 
describing an “Institutional First Amendment” that would accord 
special treatment to certain institutions like schools and the press. 
  But just as the marketplace of ideas fails to account for institutions, 
the Institutional First Amendment fails to account for the marketplace 
of ideas. As it turns out, the two theories are not only reconcilable but 
complementary. This Article brings them together, using the New 
Institutional Economics to describe the “speech institutions”—such as 
schools and universities—that play the same cost-reducing role in the 
marketplace of ideas as other institutions do in the market for goods 
and services. Courts should defer to the speech rules of marketplace-
of-ideas-enhancing institutions for the same reason and to the same 
degree that economists defer to the private norms of market-
enhancing institutions. The Article then tests the descriptive and 
normative validity of this “New Institutional First Amendment,” 
finding that it both explains and justifies much of the Court’s school 
speech doctrine, including its 2007 ruling in Morse v. Frederick. It 
also justifies the special status of universities as speech institutions, 
and suggests an explanation for some of the current weaknesses in 
commercial speech doctrine. By addressing the “economic” 
objections to the marketplace metaphor, the Article attempts to better 
describe, explain, and rehabilitate the marketplace of ideas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a single passage of his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United 
States,1 Justice Holmes—joined by Justice Brandeis—conceptualized 
the purpose of free speech so powerfully that he revolutionized not 
just First Amendment doctrine, but popular and academic 
 
 1. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
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understandings of free speech.2 The metaphor he employed was the 
“marketplace of ideas.”3 In Holmes’s words: 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their 
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our 
Constitution.4 
Free speech, in Holmes’s framework, is worthy of constitutional 
protection precisely because—like the free flow of goods and 
services—it creates a competitive environment in which good ideas 
flourish and bad ideas fail.5 This theory provided the first justification 
for a broad freedom of expression commensurate with the sweeping 
language of the First Amendment itself.6 Never before or since has a 
Justice conceived a metaphor that has done so much to change the 
way that courts, lawyers, and the public understand an entire area of 
 
 2. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 
1278 n.97 (2005) (suggesting that the popular view—though “crude” and not endorsed by 
Schauer himself—is that “the First Amendment started in 1919” when Abrams was penned). 
 3. The phrase “marketplace of ideas” was not actually Holmes’s. Trade imperfections 
being what they are, the marketplace of ideas has accorded Holmes credit for what was in fact 
Justice Brennan’s turn of phrase. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise 
willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace 
of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”); see also CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 
U.S. 94, 199 (1973) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I can only conclude that 
there is simply no overriding First Amendment interest of broadcasters that can justify the 
absolute exclusion of virtually all of our citizens from the most effective ‘marketplace of ideas’ 
ever devised.”). 
 4. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 5. R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 27 (1977) (“The 
rationale of the First Amendment is that only if an idea is subject to competition in the 
marketplace can it be discovered (through acceptance or rejection) whether it is false or not.”). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the Freedom of 
Speech . . . .”); see Pnina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justification 
for Free Speech, 4 J.L. & POL. 451, 454 (1988) (“This dissent for the first time attached a theory 
of freedom of expression to the language of the first amendment.”); see also Bruce C. Hafen, 
Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as Mediating 
Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 704 n.206 (1987) (including Abrams among the cases that laid 
the foundation for “today’s accepted free speech doctrine”). 
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constitutional law.7 Its influence has been both descriptive and 
normative, dominating the explanation of and the justification for 
free speech in the United States. 
But while First Amendment doctrine has carried Holmes’s 
laissez-faire marketplace banner more or less faithfully since Abrams, 
economic theory has not. Holmes’s metaphor describes the 
marketplace as an atomistic place where individuals costlessly 
compete to their mutual benefit.8 This simplistic view of the market 
 
 7. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 73 (1960) (arguing that 
establishing truth through a marketplace of ideas “is not merely the ‘best’ test. There is no 
other.”); William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment 
Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“In Speech Clause jurisprudence, for example, the oft-
repeated metaphor that the First Amendment fosters a marketplace of ideas that allows truth to 
ultimately prevail over falsity has been virtually canonized.”). 
In an attempt to chart the degree to which “[t]he marketplace of ideas permeates the 
Supreme Court’s first amendment jurisprudence,” Stanley Ingber listed the following cases, all 
of them major landmarks in the doctrine: 
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–67 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 
267 n.5 (1981); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 
(1981); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537–38 (1980); FCC 
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 
809, 826 (1975); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974); Red 
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 
(1967). 
Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 n.2. The list 
has grown since Ingber compiled it. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (“Many 
persons . . . will choose simply to abstain from protected speech . . . harming not only themselves 
but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” (citation 
omitted)); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (“[A] more pressing 
constitutional question would arise if Government funding resulted in the imposition of a 
disproportionate burden calculated to drive ‘certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’” 
(quoting Simon & Shuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 
116 (1991))); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (discussing “[t]he dramatic expansion of 
this new marketplace of ideas”); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996) 
(“[W]e held that it was error to assume that commercial speech was entitled to no First 
Amendment protection or that it was without value in the marketplace of ideas.” (citing 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975))); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116 (“[T]he 
government’s ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the 
government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.” (citing 
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991))). 
 8. Describing the legal ideology that guided Holmes’s dissent, Pnina Lahav has explained 
that “[s]ociety, in turn, was conceived not as organic but rather as atomistic—made of many 
autonomous individuals.” Lahav, supra note 6, at 455; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, First 
Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1653 (1998) 
(“Despite its frequent individualist rhetoric—including depictions of lone speakers on 
soapboxes and of buyers and sellers in a marketplace of ideas—First Amendment law must 
regularly take account of organizations engaged in speech activity that stand somewhere 
between the individual and the state.”). The First Amendment has also come to be associated 
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has fallen out of favor with economists, who realized long ago what 
critics of the marketplace of ideas metaphor have argued: The market 
is an imperfect and frequently malfunctioning machine, and the costs 
of exchange add friction to its gears. This friction, which economists 
call “transaction costs,” includes the time and expenditure needed to 
find, evaluate, and obtain good ideas or products.9 And although 
Holmes’s metaphor does not account for them, these costs exist in the 
marketplace of ideas just as surely as they do in the economic market. 
But rather than defending a view of the idealized, neoclassical 
market—as Holmes’s supporters have—economists responded by 
creating a new model, one that accounts for transaction costs. Led by 
Ronald Coase,10 Douglass North,11 and Oliver Williamson,12 among 
others,13 many economists have embraced a richer understanding of 
 
not just with an atomistic marketplace of ideas, but with support for individual rights and a 
profound distrust of social institutions. Bruce C. Hafen, Comment, Hazelwood School District 
and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 686; Stanley Ingber, 
Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First Amendment in Institutional 
Context, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (1990). 
 9. R.H. COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 
95, 114 (1988). 
 10. See generally Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72, 
72 (1998) (“It is commonly said, and it may be true, that the new institutional economics started 
with my article, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) with its explicit introduction of transaction costs 
into economic analysis.”). 
 11. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990) (analyzing how institutions contribute to long-term 
economic performance and providing a “framework to integrate institutional analysis into 
economics and economic history”). 
 12. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, 
Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 595, 601 (2000) (discussing the development of the New 
Institutional Economics and proposing the “remediableness criterion” as an alternative 
formulation of efficiency under which “an extant mode of organization for which no superior 
feasible alternative can be described and implemented with expected net gains is presumed to be 
efficient”). 
 13. See generally THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 6–7 
(1990) (construing the Neoinstitutional Economics approach under which certain neoclassical 
assumptions are relaxed, and distinguishing this approach from New Institutional Economics, 
under which certain neoclassical assumptions are rejected); THE FRONTIERS OF THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (John N. Drobak & John V.C. Nye eds., 1997) (compiling a series 
of articles by scholars of New Institutional Economics, including John V.C. Nye and John N. 
Drobak, written for a conference held at Washington University in March 1995 to mark 
Douglass North’s win of the 1993 Nobel Prize in Economics); THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT (John Harris et al. eds., 1995) (compiling a 
series of articles by scholars of New Institutional Economics, including John Toye and Robert 
H. Bates, written for a conference organized by the Third World Economic History and 
Development Group to analyze the movement’s application to development economics). 
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the institutions—not just individuals—that make the market economy 
work. Though diverse in their interests and approaches, these 
economists gather under the flag of the New Institutional Economics 
(NIE), which has become a preferred framework for analyzing 
economic development.14 NIE analysis focuses not just on individuals’ 
attempts to maximize their own utility in an idealized market—the 
Holmesian view of the marketplace—but also on understanding how 
transaction costs make the market malfunction, and how institutions 
help or hinder individuals’ attempts to overcome those costs.15 
Bolstered by empirical and social science evidence, NIE scholars have 
argued persuasively that many institutions lower the costs of 
exchange, and that such institutions should be entitled to deference 
from would-be regulators. 
Meanwhile, as part of a revival of interest in institutional context 
in constitutional law,16 First Amendment scholarship has taken an 
interest in institutions as well, albeit without reference to institutional 
economics. Some First Amendment scholars—most notably and most 
successfully Frederick Schauer17—have begun to sketch the contours 
of an “Institutional First Amendment” that would be better attuned 
to certain speech-enhancing social institutions. Under Schauer’s 
 
 14. Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 229, 239 
(1999) (“Across the variety of social sciences, the theoretical approach that possibly has the 
most currency is institutionalism.”). 
 15. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357, 375 (2001) (noting that the New Institutional Economics “is 
united by its concern with transaction costs in understanding economic phenomena”). 
 16. See generally Symposium, Constitutional “Niches”: The Role of Institutional Context in 
Constitutional Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463 (2007) (collecting articles addressing educational 
institutions, the institutions of federalism, national security institutions, and the workplace). 
Legal scholars often use the word “institution” to refer to large categories such as the market, 
courts, or the legislature. See, e.g., NEAL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994) (focusing on how society 
allocates governance authority across the political process, the market, and courts); ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL (2007) 
(describing how law can promote democratic institutions); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian 
Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 888 (2003) (arguing for greater 
attention to the respective interpretive capacities of courts and the legislature); see also Mark D. 
Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
1513, 1516 (2005) (arguing that constitutional principles should apply differently to federal, 
state, and local governments, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach). 
 17. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1259–60 (arguing that as institutional differentiation 
advances, First Amendment doctrine should develop a capacity to distinguish among 
institutions). 
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approach, courts should (and arguably do18) accord First Amendment 
protection to institutions depending on the degree to which those 
institutions serve important First Amendment values.19 Thus, 
institutions that advance the First Amendment’s underlying values 
are entitled to some deference when engaging in speech conduct. 
Schools and the institutional press, for example, might be given 
increased speech protection as compared to prisons or the military. 
But just as the marketplace of ideas lacks an understanding of 
institutions, the Institutional First Amendment lacks an 
understanding of the marketplace. The institutional approach draws 
its strength from a nuanced approach to the role of institutions, not 
just individuals, in free speech. It offers a rich understanding of 
institutions, but fails to account for the marketplace metaphor that 
has guided free speech analysis for nearly a century. As a result, the 
Institutional First Amendment is largely divorced from the dominant 
First Amendment framework. 
Considered in tandem, however, the institutional and 
marketplace conceptions of the First Amendment provide a holistic 
descriptive and normative conception of the practice and purpose of 
free speech, one that rehabilitates Holmes’s doctrine-changing 
metaphor and simultaneously incorporates a richer view of the 
marketplace and the institutions that make it work. This Article 
brings the theories together. 
Part I begins by revisiting Holmes’s conception of the 
marketplace of ideas, describing its power and influence and the 
understanding of the market on which it relies. The second Section of 
Part I then demonstrates how the economic understanding of the 
“marketplace” has evolved since Holmes invoked it, thanks largely to 
the contributions of the New Institutional Economics. 
Part II advances a new theory of the First Amendment—the New 
Institutional First Amendment—which integrates Justice Holmes’s 
marketplace metaphor with the lessons of institutional economics. 
This theory justifies the special treatment of certain speech 
institutions, and does so by reference to the marketplace metaphor 
that has guided First Amendment theory and jurisprudence for 
 
 18. See Scott A. Moss, Prisoners and Students and Workers—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note 
About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 
1639 (2007) (arguing that courts are overly sensitive to tailoring when it comes to certain 
institutions such as prisons and schools). 
 19. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1270. 
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almost a century. It argues that “speech institutions” deserve 
deference by lawmakers because, and only to the extent that, they 
improve the marketplace of ideas. It is this principle—use of the 
marketplace metaphor to separate good speech institutions from 
bad—that separates the “New” Institutional First Amendment 
approach from that advocated by Professor Schauer. Part II begins by 
describing Schauer’s Institutional First Amendment, then carries 
Schauer’s theory forward by joining it with the insights of the New 
Institutional Economics. The final Sections of Part II suggest ways to 
identify and encourage market-enhancing speech institutions, again 
drawing on the lessons of NIE. 
Part III then tests the descriptive accuracy of the New 
Institutional First Amendment theory by applying it to the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of First Amendment claims involving schools and 
universities, two of the most important speech institutions. Measured 
against the Court’s institutional free speech jurisprudence, including 
its 2007 decision in Morse v. Frederick,20 the New Institutional First 
Amendment performs well as a descriptive and analytic tool. The 
theory also helps explain—although cannot fully resolve—many of 
the problems with contemporary commercial speech doctrine. 
I.  THE MARKETPLACE OF  
IDEAS AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
A. The Marketplace of Ideas 
Holmes’s invocation of the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor, 
though it came in a dissent, has had as major an impact as any 
Supreme Court decision on popular and academic thinking about the 
First Amendment. Indeed, “[i]t is almost impossible to overstate the 
importance of Justice Holmes’s dissent in shaping American law and 
society.”21 
Scholars and commentators have generally conceptualized the 
metaphor as invoking the perfect competition of an idealized 
neoclassical free market. Bad ideas should be no more feared than 
bad products or services; they will simply lose out to better 
 
 20. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
 21. Note, The Impermeable Life: Unsolicited Communications in the Marketplace of Ideas, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1314 (2005). 
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competitors, so long as all are freely available.22 As John Milton—
whose Areopagitica 23 was an intellectual predecessor to Holmes’s 
Abrams dissent24—wrote, in a style only slightly more literary than 
Holmes’s, “Let [truth] and falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth 
put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”25 In Holmes and 
Milton’s view, the “truth” should emerge from the free and 
competitive exchange of ideas.26 
Soon after its initial appearance in 1919, the marketplace 
metaphor came to dominate the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence. In 1927, Justice Brandeis—who had joined Holmes’s 
Abrams dissent—revisited and re-endorsed the marketplace 
metaphor from a slightly different angle. Concurring in Whitney v. 
California,27 Brandeis wrote that “freedom to think as you will and to 
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
 
 22. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 115 (1990) (praising 
a “Darwinian test” for ideas as producing better results than a “centrally managed” economy); 
Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1964) (“The 
traditional defense of the free market as a method of organizing economic life has been 
utilitarian or instrumental. . . . The traditional defense of the free market in ideas has in the 
main also been utilitarian.”). 
 23. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED 
PRINTING (H.B. Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co. 1959) (1644). 
 24. Areopagitica has spawned a rich literature as well, frequently as a sibling to Holmes’s 
Abrams dissent and John Stuart Mill’s theory that human ideas and opinions prove themselves 
only when challenged and only over time. See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, reprinted in THE 
SIX GREAT HUMANISTIC ESSAYS OF JOHN STUART MILL 143 (Albert William Levi ed., 
Washington Square Press 1963) (1859) (“Yet it is evidence in itself . . . that ages are no more 
infallible than individuals; every age having held many opinions which subsequent ages have 
deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that many opinions, now general, will be 
rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.”); see also 
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 509 (1941) (grouping Holmes 
with Mill and Milton as leading opponents of censorship in favor of open discussion). 
 25. MILTON, supra note 23, at 45. Thomas Jefferson expressed similar sentiments: 
[T]ruth is great and will prevail, if left to herself; . . . she is the proper and sufficient 
antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human 
interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate; errors 
ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them. 
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 545, 546 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1950) 
 26. Other scholars, pursuing a slightly more nuanced view of the marketplace, have argued 
that the “value that is to be realized is not in the possible attainment of truth, but rather, in the 
existential value of the search itself.” Marshall, supra note 7, at 4. But see Frederick Schauer, 
Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 699, 724 (1991) (arguing that the 
search for truth has no intrinsic value). 
 27. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
01__BLOCHER.DOC 4/16/2008  8:29:05 AM 
2008] NEW INSTITUTIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT 831 
spread of political truth,”28 and that in the case of bad ideas or 
falsehoods, “the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.”29 Brandeis’s 
conception of the First Amendment has been described as depending 
on the pursuit of self-rule, or self-fulfillment, or civic virtue, rather 
than simply truth.30 But whether justified in terms of truth or virtue, 
the marketplace was the animating metaphor for both Holmes and 
Brandeis. Since 1919, when Abrams was decided, in a variety of 
majority,31 concurring,32 and dissenting33 opinions, Justices have 
repeatedly returned to Holmes’s basic idea that “[h]owever 
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on 
the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other 
ideas.”34 
For all of its power, the marketplace of ideas metaphor also has 
explanatory weaknesses and normative difficulties, almost all of 
which track the shortcomings of its idealized view of an uninhibited, 
costless, and perfectly efficient free market.35 Although this idealized 
conception of the marketplace may have held sway in 1919,36 
economists have long since realized that the “neoclassical” view, 
though useful as an analytic tool, is far from descriptively accurate. In 
Professor Coase’s estimation, the neoclassical approach “is a view 
disdainful of what happens in the real world, but it is one to which 
 
 28. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 29. Id. at 377. 
 30. Lahav, supra note 6, at 453. 
 31. See cases cited supra note 7. 
 32. E.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 265 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The very ‘purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969))). 
 33. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“When 
ideas compete in the market for acceptance, full and free discussion exposes the false and they 
gain few adherents. . . . Full and free discussion has indeed been the first article of our faith.”); 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that an idea 
“offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or 
some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth”). 
 34. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974). 
 35. See Ingber, supra note 7, at 16–17 (“[T]he marketplace of ideas is as flawed as the 
economic market.”). 
 36. Professor Coase’s The Nature of the Firm is credited with introducing the concept of 
transaction costs and thus exposing the flawed assumptions underlying the neoclassical model. It 
did not appear until 1937. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 
(1937). 
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[neoclassical] economists have become accustomed, and they live in 
their world without discomfort.”37 So it is with the “marketplace of 
ideas” conception. As Paul Brietzke puts it, both models ignore 
a host of factors that make us human, including altruism, habit, 
bigotry, panic, genius, luck or its absence, and factors such as peer 
pressures, institutions, and cultures that turn us into social animals. 
A dehumanized, desocialized, and often sexist ‘economic man’ [or 
‘speech man’] supposedly goes through life as if it were one long 
series of analogies to isolated transactions on the New York Stock 
Exchange.38 
Professor Brietzke and other critics of the marketplace of ideas 
metaphor have frequently drawn parallels between failures in the 
real-world market and failures in the marketplace of ideas.39 Perhaps 
the most frequently identified failures are those caused by resource 
inequalities and disparities in communicative power and ability.40 The 
marketplace of ideas, these critics argue, is likely to reflect and justify 
 
 37. Coase, supra note 10, at 72. 
 38. Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 951, 
962–63 (1997) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 39. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 7, at 49–55. Whereas failures in the real world marketplace 
have been used to justify state intervention in the market, failures in the marketplace of ideas 
are generally used to criticize the theory and to argue that some other justification for free 
speech should be pursued in its stead. Economists have noted this unequal treatment with 
frustration. See Coase, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing the dichotomy between the assumptions of 
the marketplace of ideas and those of the traditional marketplace); Director, supra note 22, at 6 
(arguing that the distinction between the marketplace of ideas and the economic marketplace is 
incorrect). 
 40. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted in its campaign finance jurisprudence that 
resource disparities can threaten the marketplace of political ideas. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) (finding that the government has a 
compelling interest in preventing corporations from using their resources “to obtain ‘an unfair 
advantage in the political marketplace’” (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 
238, 257 (1986))); see also CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 77–78 (1993) (arguing 
that First Amendment doctrine, even when it nominally protects the marketplace of ideas, has 
not “guaranteed free and equal speech” because of imbalances in speakers’ power); Derek E. 
Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy of the 
Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 673–96 (2006) (describing perceptual biases that 
complicate the acquisition and processing of information); Darren Bush, The “Marketplace of 
Ideas”: Is Judge Posner Chasing Don Quixote’s Windmills?, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1114–16 
(2000) (noting the possibility of monopolies in the marketplace of ideas). 
Similar arguments could be made—though they rarely are—about the ability of listeners 
to absorb and comprehend speech. Critics of the marketplace of ideas tend to focus on the 
ability of speakers to dominate, and regard a speaker’s inability to effectively express a 
viewpoint as a harm to the speaker, rather than to the listener who cannot hear or understand 
the viewpoint. A rich view of the market should consider both harms. 
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the positions of powerful speakers, rather than the merit or “truth” of 
the ideas they express. A related criticism suggests that even if the 
expression of ideas could be equalized, perhaps through government 
action,41 the efficiency of the marketplace of ideas would still be 
strictly limited by participants’ imperfect ability to reason.42 And even 
if people could reason perfectly, the market still might not function as 
Holmes envisioned, so long as their preferences are too unstable to 
permit the pursuit of a single “truth.”43 Competition in such an 
imperfect marketplace of ideas will not lead to ideal results, critics 
allege, so long as the participants disagree about what good ideas are, 
or cannot identify good ideas when they see them. Just as economists 
argue that regulation of real-world markets is desirable when and 
only when the market fails—because of fraud or monopoly, for 
example—proponents of the marketplace of ideas theory can argue 
that regulations of speech are permissible only when there are market 
failures in the marketplace of ideas.44 As in the economic market, 
such failures are likely to occur when circumstances make open 
competition impossible. 
Although generally avoiding the rhetoric of “market failure,” the 
Supreme Court has long been attuned to the possibility of certain 
speech-related market failures, such as the “emergency” situation to 
which Justice Brandeis alluded in Whitney. One easy example—also a 
brainchild of Justice Holmes and also born in 1919—is the clear and 
 
 41. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 16 (1993) 
(arguing for a “New Deal for speech”). Daniel Farber has also used the market failure argument 
to suggest greater government involvement in speech, arguing that speech may be an 
underproduced public good that the government should, if anything, subsidize. Daniel A. 
Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 554, 558–61 (1991). 
 42. For an explanation of this objection as applied to the marketplace of ideas, see Alvin I. 
Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas, 2 LEGAL THEORY 1, 9 
(1996) (explaining the criticism but not endorsing it). Behavioral economics, with its recognition 
of the mental biases that can interfere with accurate information processing, is an important 
source on this point. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998) (describing a 
“more accurate conception of choice” based on actual human behavior and relating this 
behavior to prescriptive and normative ideas about the law). 
 43. Goldman & Cox, supra note 42, at 9 (explaining but disclaiming the notion that the 
“mutability of beliefs undercuts objective truth”). 
 44. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 592–94 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  
§ 12-19, at 946 (2d ed. 1988) (“[G]overnment, while it may not close the market, may move to 
correct its defects and regulate its incidental consequences.”). 
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present danger test announced in Schenck v. United States.45 The 
Schenck test denies constitutional protection to speech that creates a 
“clear and present danger that it will bring about the substantive evils 
that Congress has a right to prevent.”46 Fifty years later, Brandenburg 
v. Ohio47 refined that test, holding that the First Amendment protects 
even subversive speech unless that speech is intended to produce, and 
is likely to produce, imminent serious violence.48 The mob scenes 
contemplated in Brandenburg, like the clearly and presently 
dangerous situations described in Schenck, represent a kind of market 
failure. When hateful or provocative speech is delivered to an angry 
and potentially violent group of listeners, realistically there is little 
room for “good ideas”—such as pleas for calm or peace—to win out. 
Even if the provocative speech is “true,” and violence warranted, it 
will prevail not on its merits but because it has faced no true 
competition. In such emergency situations, the usual costs of 
communication—the cost and time needed to consider other 
messages, for example—become prohibitive because of the threat of 
immediate violence. This makes market failures likely and the cost of 
such failures high. 
Other free speech “exceptions” can also be explained as failures 
in the marketplace of ideas. Writing for the majority in FEC v. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,49 Justice Brennan cited Abrams 
and noted that its “market metaphor has guided congressional 
regulation in the area of campaign activity.”50 Invoking the concept of 
“[p]olitical ‘free trade,’” Justice Brennan noted that “[d]irect 
corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that 
resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to 
provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.”51 Of course, 
the precise degree to which Congress can constitutionally address that 
 
 45. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Ingber, supra note 7, at 17–22 
(describing the clear and present danger test as related to the failures of the marketplace of 
ideas). 
 46. Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 47. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
 48. Id. at 447–48. 
 49. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986) (holding that the Federal 
Election Campaign Act was unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit group, in part because—
unlike a for-profit corporation—the nonprofit group “was formed to disseminate political ideas, 
not to amass capital. The resources it has available are not a function of its success in the 
economic marketplace, but its popularity in the political marketplace.”). 
 50. Id. at 257 & n.10. 
 51. Id. at 257. 
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fair trade remains a hotly contested issue whose ultimate resolution is 
anything but clear.52 “Fighting words” doctrine53 and hate speech also 
find themselves grouped into the “market failure” category; they 
arguably cause harms that cannot be remedied by more speech.54 
Because hate speech disempowers those at whom it is directed, the 
argument goes, anti-hate and anti-fighting speech has no real chance 
to “compete.”55 The Court has endorsed other exceptions to the 
marketplace of ideas based on the supposed failure of certain kinds of 
speech to advance it. In Miller v. California,56 for example, the Court 
declared that comparing the exchange of political ideas “with 
commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand 
conception of the First Amendment.”57 Miller explicitly denied 
obscenity any First Amendment protection for the same reason that 
fighting words receive none: “such utterances are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”58 The Court 
thus found that obscenity has no place in the market, and that it may 
be regulated by reference to social institutions like order and 
morality.59 
 
 52. In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007), a majority of Justices 
agreed that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) unconstitutionally forbade 
certain issue advertisements, but could not agree as to why. See id. at 2673 (opinion of Roberts, 
C.J., joined by Alito, J.) (finding that the BCRA was unconstitutional as applied because the 
campaign ads were not “express advocacy or its functional equivalent”); id. at 2675, 2686 
(Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (stating that the test for reviewing as-applied challenges to the relevant section of the 
BCRA was unconstitutionally unclear, and that therefore the statute should not be enforced). 
 53. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 54. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, 
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 177 (1982); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974) (“[A]n opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo the 
harm of defamatory falsehood.”). 
 55. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 
85 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 385–86 (1991) (arguing that racist speech distorts discourse by 
disempowering minority rebuttal, “a result at odds, certainly, with marketplace theories of the 
first amendment”). 
 56. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 57. Id. at 34; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“[I]mplicit in the 
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social 
importance.”). 
 58. Miller, 413 U.S. at 20–21 (quoting Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 571–72); see also Roth, 354 
U.S. at 485 (same). 
 59. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
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Despite the power of the market failure critique, and 
notwithstanding the exceptions announced in Schenck, Brandenburg, 
Miller, and other cases, the Court continues to invoke the 
marketplace of ideas metaphor as generally justifying broad speech 
protections, not limitations.60 Thus although market failure rhetoric 
has often been employed to justify government involvement in the 
real-world market, it has not had a similar impact on First 
Amendment doctrine or theory. This differential treatment is as old 
as the marketplace of ideas metaphor. As many critics have pointed 
out, Holmes himself was no staunch defender of the laissez-faire 
economic market,61 and the Court has generally followed his lead by 
treating the two markets differently. Justice Douglas, in Beauharnais 
v. Illinois,62 made the point explicitly: “Free speech, free press, free 
exercise of religion are placed separate and apart; they are above and 
beyond the police power; they are not subject to regulation in the 
manner of factories, slums, apartment houses, production of oil, and 
the like.”63 
Courts have clung to an idealized, neoclassical view of the 
marketplace of ideas far more tenaciously than economists have, or 
than courts themselves have, when it comes to the “real-world” 
market. As Ronald Coase, Aaron Director, and other economists 
have pointed out, the marketplace of ideas is far more free from state 
regulation than the economic marketplace, despite the acknowledged 
 
 60. See cases cited supra note 7. 
 61. Ingber, supra note 7, at 5 n.14 (comparing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), with Holmes’s dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 
42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 949 (1995) (“Now contrast Holmes with—well, Holmes. . . . Government 
attempts at regulating free trade in labor were permissible; government attempts at regulating 
free trade of ideas were not.”). 
 62. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
 63. Id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Black, who was famous for his dogged 
commitment to an absolutist First Amendment, was untroubled by government regulation of 
the economic marketplace. Compare Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., 
concurring) (“I read ‘no law . . . abridging’ to mean no law abridging.”) (alteration in original), 
with Cities Serv. Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179, 189 (1950) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that 
“the alleged federal constitutional questions are frivolous” when it comes to federal regulation 
of natural gas prices). But because Justice Black’s reading of the First Amendment was based 
more on his reading of the words of the First Amendment and less on support for the 
“marketplace of ideas” metaphor, the comparison to Holmes is more interesting than fair. 
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market failures in both.64 Frustrated by this unequal treatment, Coase 
and Director have criticized “intellectuals [who] have shown a 
tendency to exalt the market for ideas and to depreciate the market 
for goods.”65 This inequality, Coase has argued, is utterly indefensible, 
particularly because the market of ideas is no more important—and, 
for most people, quite a bit less important—than the market for 
goods, and is not necessarily any more entitled to freedom from 
government regulation.66 Director, also a leading figure in the 
Chicago School of Economics, argued the same thing a decade 
earlier,67 but with a similarly negligible impact. 
Criticisms of the idealized neoclassical market have thus had a 
very different impact on economics than on First Amendment 
doctrine. As far as the latter is concerned, the deconstruction of the 
marketplace of ideas as a “legitimizing myth”68 has not yet given rise 
to an improved economic metaphor. Scholars and courts continue to 
see the marketplace of ideas in neoclassical terms, debating its merits 
as if the only alternative would be to adopt a theory of the First 
Amendment based on the value of speech to democracy,69 or the 
 
 64. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 5, at 2; R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market 
for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 385 (1964) [hereinafter Coase, The Market for Goods]; 
Director, supra note 22, at 8. 
 65. Coase, The Market for Goods, supra note 64, at 385; see also Director, supra note 22, at 
9 (“[P]roponents of the priority of the market place for ideas. . . . must of necessity rely on 
exhortation and on the fragile support of self-denying ordinances in constitutions.”). 
 66. Coase, supra note 5, at 4 (“There is simply no reason to suppose that for the great mass 
of people the market for ideas is more important than the market for goods. But even if the 
market for ideas were more important, it does not follow that the two markets should be treated 
differently.”). 
 67. Director, supra note 22, at 6 (“[For] the bulk of mankind . . . freedom of choice as 
owners of resources in choosing within available and continually changing opportunities, areas 
of employment, investment, and consumption is fully as important as freedom of discussion and 
participation in government.”). See generally Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the 
Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41 (1992) (arguing the distrust directed toward the 
government in speech regulation should apply with equal force in regulation of property rights). 
 68. See generally Ingber, supra note 7 (discussing the marketplace of ideas as a 
“legitimizing myth”). 
 69. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587–88 (1980) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment . . . has a structural role to play in securing 
and fostering our republican system of self-government. . . . The structural model links the First 
Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus 
entails solicitude not only for communication itself, but also for the indispensable conditions of 
meaningful communication.”); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 88 (1948) (arguing that Holmes’s individualistic 
marketplace theory of free speech misses the true purpose of the First Amendment, which is to 
protect the public freedom necessary for self-government); SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 22– 
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intrinsic value of speech to self-realization,70 or some other non-
“economic” value. Economists, however, have responded to the 
deconstruction of the neoclassical economic model by replacing it 
with more nuanced competitors, including most notably the New 
Institutional Economics. 
B. New Institutional Economics 
Holmes’s marketplace metaphor invokes a place where 
individuals (speakers) trade goods and services (ideas) in a 
competitive environment where the good ideas are destined to beat 
out the bad. It is, in essence, a neoclassical view of the economy. But 
since at least the 1930s, economists—led by Nobel laureates Ronald 
Coase and Douglass North, and also by Oliver Williamson, who 
coined the term New Institutional Economics71—have increasingly 
abandoned that neoclassical view in favor of a thickened 
understanding of the market. Far from being a place where 
individuals costlessly and perfectly pursue their self-interest, the 
marketplace turns out to be populated with institutions that 
regularize interactions and lower transaction costs. NIE scholars have 
argued persuasively that many of these institutions improve the 
market more than government regulation would, and that such 
institutions (and their internal norms) should thus receive substantial 
deference from the government. 
1. Transaction Costs and Institutions.  In the neoclassical view of 
the market, self-interested individuals work to perfectly maximize 
their happiness through a series of costless transactions. This is the 
view of the economy familiar to many economics students. But in 
Professor Coase’s blunt assessment, “[The neoclassical economy] 
lives in the minds of economists but not on earth.”72 
Coase’s key insight, which destroyed the practical applicability of 
the neoclassical model and spurred the growth of the NIE, was the 
 
23 (arguing that Madisonian ideas of democracy, rather than free market principles, should 
shape First Amendment theory). 
 70. Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 79–81 (1988) (describing and criticizing 
this argument). 
 71. Coase, supra note 10, at 72 (crediting Williamson). 
 72. R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 714 
(1992). 
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realization that the gears of the economic machine are not free from 
friction. Any time people transact, they must pay not only the price of 
the goods or services exchanged, but also the price of finding the 
good in the first place, evaluating its worth, and so on. This process 
costs time, energy, and money. Economists have dubbed these 
expenses “transaction costs”—the costs of measuring resources or 
claims, understanding and utilizing rights, and negotiating and 
enforcing transactions.73 Coase—who has acknowledged, though not 
exactly claimed, paternity of NIE74—divided transaction costs into 
four categories: search, information, negotiation, and enforcement.75 
Contrary to the neoclassical model’s assumptions of perfect 
information and costless exchange, Coase recognized that these costs 
distort the market, making the mathematical predictions of 
neoclassical models largely inapplicable in the real world. Every 
transaction cost, he realized, is a small market failure. 
But rather than simply pointing out that transaction costs create 
market failures, as critics of the marketplace of ideas metaphor have 
essentially done, NIE scholars took the additional step of 
incorporating those costs into a new economic model. In doing so, 
they connected theoretical neoclassical economics with the insights of 
empirical social sciences. In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, 
Professor North sketched the general structure of the NIE: “The 
analytical framework is a modification of neo-classical theory. What it 
retains is the fundamental assumption of scarcity and hence 
competition and the analytical tools of micro-economic theory. What 
it modifies is the rationality assumption. What it adds is the 
dimension of time.”76 The NIE thus preserves the market metaphor, 
 
 73. See EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC 
THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 40 (1997). 
 74. Coase, supra note 10, at 72 (“It is commonly said, and it may be true, that the new 
institutional economics started with my article, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) with its explicit 
introduction of transaction costs into economic analysis.” (referencing Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, supra note 36)). 
 75. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra note 36, at 390–92. Ironically, the theorem that 
bears Coase’s name suggests just the opposite—that, so long as property rights are well-defined, 
individuals will always negotiate their way to an optimal allocation of resources, no matter how 
those resources are initially allocated. Coase himself pointed out—repeatedly and to no avail—
that this theorem did not represent his view of the real-world market, and that in fact the 
existence of transactions costs rendered it little more than a thought experiment. See Coase, 
supra note 72, at 714. 
 76. Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 
359 (1994) (reprinting North’s 1993 Nobel Prize acceptance speech) [hereinafter North, Nobel 
Prize Lecture]. 
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at least as an aspiration and the motor of competition, but 
incorporates a more realistic view of the market’s functioning. As 
Professor Williamson puts it, “Students of the NIE eschew 
hypothetical ideals—which work off of omniscience, benevolence, 
zero transaction costs, full credibility, and the like—and deal instead 
with feasible organizational alternatives, all of which are flawed.”77 
Just as transaction costs highlight the shortcomings of 
neoclassical theory, they also explain the existence and functioning of 
institutions, which are the protagonists of the NIE story. Coase 
summarizes the need for a new institutional approach by pointing to 
the essential role of institutions in exchange: “It makes little sense for 
economists to discuss the process of exchange without specifying the 
institutional setting within which the trading takes place, since this 
affects the incentives to produce and the costs of transacting.”78 North 
simplifies the equation: “When it is costly to transact, then institutions 
matter. And it is costly to transact.”79 He goes on to define 
“institutions”: 
  Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g., 
rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of 
behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their 
enforcement characteristics.80 
Institutions include not just law, but also social norms, mores, and 
other private rules of conduct. Together these institutions direct the 
functioning of an economy to a far greater degree than state 
regulation alone. According to Coase, 
[T]he costs of exchange depend on the institutions of a country: its 
legal system, its political system, its social system, its educational 
system, its culture, and so on. In effect it is the institutions that 
 
 77. Williamson, supra note 12, at 601. 
 78. Coase, supra note 72, at 718. 
 79. North, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 76, at 360; see also NORTH, supra note 11, at 12 
(“The most important message, one with profound implications for restructuring economic 
theory, is that when it is costly to transact, institutions matter. And as Wallis and North (1986) 
have demonstrated in their measurement of the transaction costs going though the market (the 
transaction sector) in the U.S. economy, it is costly to transact.”); Avery Katz, Taking Private 
Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1758 (1996) (arguing that the “real lesson of the 
Coase theorem” is “that private lawmaking is as important as public lawmaking, if not more 
so”). 
 80. See North, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 76, at 360. 
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govern the performance of an economy, and it is this that gives the 
‘new institutional economics’ its importance for economists.81 
In addition to governing private conduct, institutions often help 
overcome transaction costs. Institutions’ internal rules (which, as 
North suggests, may themselves be “institutions”) aid in this function. 
A strongly held norm of fair dealing, for example, reduces transaction 
costs by lessening the need for formal contracting and enforcement 
mechanisms. When levels of trust in a society are high, transactions 
are cheaper because information and negotiation costs are lower—
transacting individuals do not have to spend as much time or money 
investigating the background of their trading partners.82 Similarly, as 
Robert Ellickson stressed in Order Without Law, social norms are 
generally easier and cheaper to enforce than “formal” legal 
sanctions.83 
Despite the general support that their theory has attracted, NIE 
theorists have not yet reached any solid conclusions about what 
counts as an “institution” in the first place.84 Williamson, himself a 
father of the NIE movement, opened a 2000 article with the 
“confession . . . that we are still very ignorant about institutions” and 
the “recommendation . . . that, awaiting a unified theory, we should 
be accepting of pluralism.”85 Although its precise definition is 
unresolved, “institution” is a term of art for NIE theorists. It excludes 
many entities that are commonly referred to as “institutions.” In the 
NIE framework, entities such as the Brookings Institution or the 
Smithsonian Institution are not actually institutions, but rather 
organizations—representatives of the broader institutional categories 
of think tanks and museums. North defines organizations thus: 
 
 81. Coase, supra note 10, at 73. 
 82. Ekkehart Schlicht, On Custom, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 178, 180 
(1993) (arguing that a strongly held norm of transparent land dealings “may render many 
economic transactions possible without a need to rely on elaborate and costly safeguards. In 
this, custom may contribute to economic efficiency.”). 
 83. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 282 (1991). 
 84. Nor, it should be noted, is the definition of “transaction costs” completely clear. Oliver 
E. Williamson, Book Review, 77 CAL. L. REV. 223, 229 (1989) (reviewing R.H. COASE, THE 
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1988)) (“A chronic problem with Coase’s work has been 
that the concept of transaction costs is vague. Being very elastic, transaction costs can be—and 
sometimes are—used to rationalize any outcome whatsoever.”). 
 85. Williamson, supra note 12, at 595. Williamson does, however, offer a helpful framework 
for separating four “levels” of institutions. See id. at 596–600. 
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  Organizations are made up of groups of individuals bound 
together by some common purpose to achieve certain objectives. 
Organizations include political bodies (e.g., political parties, the 
Senate, a city council, regulatory bodies), economic bodies (e.g., 
firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives), social bodies (e.g., 
churches, clubs, athletic associations), and educational bodies (e.g., 
schools, universities, vocational training centers).86 
To simplify slightly: “If institutions are the rules of the game, 
organizations and their entrepreneurs are the players.”87 There is thus 
a difference between academia, which is an institution, and Duke 
University, which is an organization. The relationship between the 
two is close, of course, and is built on mutual dependence. 
Organizations occupy and “reflect the opportunities provided by the 
institutional matrix. . . . [I]f the institutional matrix rewards 
productive activities then organizations—firms—will come into 
existence to engage in productive activities.”88 Institutions set the 
rules. Organizations follow and—crucially for the First Amendment 
analysis here—apply them. 
2. Separating Good Institutions from Bad.  In addition to its 
descriptive advantage over neoclassical analysis, the NIE also has a 
normative component. To oversimplify slightly, the theory suggests—
and its devotees argue—that institutions are often better market 
regulators than the government and that state-centered reforms 
should often defer to private institutions and their norms. 
NIE scholars themselves are somewhat divided about whether 
institutions exist for the purpose of reducing transaction costs, or 
whether they simply do so as a by-product of whatever other need 
they fill. Professor Williamson has suggested that NIE still lacks a 
good account of institutional formation, but that the evolution of 
some institutions may be “spontaneous.”89 Professor North, too, 
writes that “[i]nstitutions are not necessarily or even usually created 
to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are 
created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to 
 
 86. North, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 76, at 361. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Williamson, supra note 12, at 597 (adding that “deliberative choice of a calculative kind 
is minimally implicated”). 
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create new rules.”90 North, however, has also argued that 
“measurement and enforcement costs are the sources of social, 
political, and economic institutions.”91 Professor Ellickson’s account 
suggests that certain institutions may have evolved as a method of 
lowering transaction costs.92 
Whether it exists by design or as a fortuitous side effect, the role 
of institutions in promoting economic growth has earned the 
endorsement of economic development theorists,93 especially those 
who study property law.94 These theorists’ guiding principle is that to 
enable economic development, structural change must focus on 
effectively integrating embedded institutions with state-driven 
reforms, and on designing institutions that lower transaction costs.95 
In Williamson’s framework, this means crafting legal institutions that 
interact well with embedded institutions, rather than trying to simply 
impose the former on the latter. Following these economic insights, 
some legal scholars have suggested that reliance on social norms, 
rather than formal legal rules, is both widespread96 and generally 
 
 90. North, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 76, at 360–61. 
 91. NORTH, supra note 11, at 27. 
 92. See ELLICKSON, supra note 83, at 167, 170–81; see also Robert Ellickson, The Market 
for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 43 (2001) (“[P]resent[ing] a semirigorous model in 
which a new norm arises out of the workings of a market for norms. . . . The model incorporates 
numerous simplifying assumptions. . . . [Including] that members of a social audience selflessly 
prefer utilitarian outcomes and that they can successfully coordinate the aggregate rewards that 
they confer.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. 
ECON. 949, 988 (2005) (“[W]e found robust evidence that property rights institutions have a 
major influence on long-run economic growth . . . while contracting institutions appear to affect 
the form of financial intermediation but have a more limited impact on growth . . . .”); see also 
Williamson, supra note 12, at 597 (describing property rights as part of the Level 2 “institutional 
environment,” the “fomal rules of the game,” and contracts as part of Level 3, “the play of the 
game”). 
 94. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The 
Primacy of Institutions Over Integration and Geography in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON. 
GROWTH 131, 132–35 (2004) (discussing three main explanations for the difference in the 
income levels of the world’s richest and poorest nations and “find[ing] that the quality of 
institutions trumps everything else”). 
 95. See generally NORTH, supra note 11, at 3 (“That institutions affect the performance of 
economies is hardly controversial. That the differential performance of economies over time is 
fundamentally influenced by the way institutions evolve is also not controversial. . . . The 
primary objective of [this] study is to achieve an understanding of the differential performance 
of economies through time . . . .”). 
 96. Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal 
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 133 (1996) (“Most people do not take 
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efficient.97 The best-known such work in legal circles is Ellickson’s 
Order Without Law, which chronicles the resolution of disputes 
between ranchers in Shasta County, California, detailing their 
preference for social norms and sanctions rather than formal legal 
rules and litigation.98 Other seminal works include Robert Cooter’s 
analysis of customary land courts in Papua New Guinea99 and Clifford 
Geertz’s study of bazaars in North Africa.100 
These scholars generally see legal reform as an exogenous 
change, and they analyze the degree to which efficiency demands that 
preexisting institutions be preserved or accommodated rather than be 
replaced.101 In terms of property, for example, this may mean giving 
special attention and respect to preexisting property norms such as 
customary easements and dispute resolution rather than 
implementing “top-down” legal change such as formal title 
registration or new land courts.102 According to the theory, where 
efficient customs and norms—institutions, that is—are in place, they 
 
their disputes to lawyers and judges. Norms, rather than laws, provide the rules of 
conduct . . . .”). 
 97. See generally AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE 
MODES OF GOVERNANCE 21–23, 152 (2004) (describing the literature of some institutions, 
organizations, and surveys from the study of alternative institutions for the protection of 
property rights and developing theoretical models of some of the same). 
 98. ELLICKSON, supra note 83, at 4. One of Professor Ellickson’s more recent contributions 
applies a similar analysis to the “order without law” in the household. Robert C. Ellickson, 
Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 297 
(2006); Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 336, 340 
(2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/04/16/ellickson.html. For a sample of Ellickson’s 
intellectual ancestry, see JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 151 (1988). 
 99. Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua New Guinea, 
25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 759 (1991). 
 100. Clifford Geertz, The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing, 
68 AM. ECON. REV. 28 (1978). For other examples of works that explore the relationship 
between legal rules and social norms, see generally Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal 
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 
(1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). For my own very modest 
contribution to the discussion, see Joseph Blocher, Note, Building on Custom: Land Tenure 
Policy and Economic Development in Ghana, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 166 (2006). 
 101. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 99, at 794 (“Legislation that disrupts customs, whether in 
the name of capitalism or socialism, may create inefficiency where there is none.”). 
 102. Id. (“Replacing customary land law with freehold substitutes markets for kin 
organization. If imposed by legislative fiat, the freehold solution will disrupt the customary 
economy by displacing its incentive system.”). 
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should be entitled to deference as against strictly legal reforms.103 The 
goal for development theorists who embrace NIE is generally to 
conceptualize ways for these institutions, many of which are 
“customary,” to become part of a “modern” legal system. These 
theorists commonly argue that many economic reforms—
establishment of statutory property rights and a free market in which 
to trade them, for example—are likely to fail if they are not attuned 
to preexisting embedded institutions.104 In his 1992 Nobel Prize 
acceptance speech, Professor Coase said presciently: 
The value of including . . . institutional factors in the corpus of 
mainstream economics is made clear by recent events in Eastern 
Europe. These ex-communist countries are advised to move to a 
market economy, and their leaders wish to do so, but without the 
appropriate institutions no market economy of any significance is 
possible.105 
This economic development rhetoric has an analogue in discussions 
of free speech in emerging democracies, as scholars of the latter often 
stress the need for speech-protective “institutions” such as the press 
and a culture of dissent.106 When these institutions are absent, a 
constitutional guarantee of free speech is unlikely to create a vibrant 
marketplace of ideas. 
But although institutions are generally the heroes in the NIE 
story, not all of them live up to expectations,107 and some are market 
 
 103. See id. For an interesting and somewhat contrasting viewpoint, see Lisa Bernstein, 
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business 
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1766–68 (1996). Professor Bernstein’s target is the premise, 
expressed in the Uniform Commercial Code and by its main drafter, Karl Llewellyn, that courts 
should try to determine “immanent business norms” and apply them in deciding cases. Id. For 
Llewellyn’s view, see K.N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 
873, 903–04 (1939). 
 104. O. Lee Reed, Law, the Rule of Law, and Property: A Foundation for the Private Market 
and Business Study, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 441, 441–42 (2001); Blocher, supra note 100, at 171–80. 
 105. Coase, supra note 72, at 714. In his own Nobel Prize speech a few years later, Professor 
North hit the same note: “Neoclassical theory is simply an inappropriate tool to analyze and 
prescribe policies that will induce development. It is concerned with the operation of markets, 
not with how markets develop.” North, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 76, at 359. 
 106. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Book Review, The Value of Dissent, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
859, 863 (2000) (reviewing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF 
AMERICA (1999)) (describing the effects of culture and political life on the meaning of free 
speech in the United States). 
 107. Katz, supra note 79, at 1749 (“[P]rivate groups and communities are subject to the same 
kinds of qualitative failures as are market and governmental institutions, and . . . there is little 
theoretical reason to presume that private community norms will tend toward complete 
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inhibiting rather than market improving. Even the most devoted 
followers of the NIE do not support “deference” to corrupt 
institutions or those, like slavery, set up to favor an oppressive 
minority.108 NIE theorists recognize that some institutions are 
controlled by elites who have self-interested reasons for maintaining 
an inefficient system.109 Other scholars stress that group norms may be 
unable to keep pace with legal and technological change, and that 
state action may be justified in the case of such entrenched, inefficient 
customs.110 
The institutions that are entitled to deference—the institutions 
the state should try to accommodate rather than change—are those 
that contribute to the free flow of goods and services.111 Separating 
“good” from “bad” institutions is a difficult task demanding not just a 
jeweler’s eye for detail (a role traditionally played by economists), 
but a prospector’s ability to discover and describe institutions in the 
first place.112 In keeping with the NIE’s holistic view of markets and 
 
efficiency.”); North, Nobel Prize Lecture, supra note 76, at 363 (“There is no guarantee that the 
beliefs and institutions that evolve through time will produce economic growth.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural 
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1684 (1996) 
(arguing that some customary norms such as racial discrimination are not entitled to legal 
deference). 
 109. See EGGERTSSON, supra note 13, at 275–76 (1990) (“Property Rights, [sometimes] 
serve the narrow self-interest of a special-interest group but cause substantial output losses to 
the community as a whole . . . .”); NORTH, supra note 11, at 48 (“[T]here is nothing in my 
argument so far about rules that implies efficiency. . . . [R]ules are, at least in good part, devised 
in the interests of private well-being rather than social well-being.”); Douglass C. North, The 
New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 17, 20 (John Harris et al. eds., 1995) 
(“Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or 
at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to 
create new rules.”). 
 110. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1697–
98 (1996) (criticizing the widespread law and economics view that the social norms of close-knit 
groups should be expected to be efficient, and arguing that the state may under some conditions 
be better at producing efficient rules). 
 111. As Aaron Director put it with regard to the real world market, “Some institutions are 
more flexible than others. We must choose those which minimize the risks of undesirable 
consequences.” Director, supra note 22, at 10. 
 112. See ELLICKSON, supra note 83, at 254–55, 283–86 (suggesting when courts should and 
should not defer to group norms). In addition to some modern scholarship such as Professor 
Ellickson’s, which is commonly considered part of the law and economics movement, the law 
and society movement demonstrated a commitment to “methods that come from outside the 
discipline [of law] itself” and to “explain[ing] legal phenomena (though not necessarily all legal 
phenomena) in terms of their social setting.” Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society 
Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 763 (1986); see also David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The 
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social institutions, this latter task—the gritty, detail-oriented job of 
identifying institutions and explaining their inner workings—has 
generally been performed by social scientists, including 
anthropologists,113 political scientists,114 and some economically 
inclined legal scholars.115 Williamson describes their work as “modest, 
slow, molecular, [and] definitive.”116 Nevertheless, he justifiably has 
“no hesitation” in “declaring that the NIE is an empirical success 
story.”117 The following Part considers whether and how that success 
might rehabilitate popular and academic understanding of the 
marketplace of ideas. 
II.  INSTITUTIONS IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
A. The Institutional First Amendment 
Although the marketplace metaphor remains the reigning (if 
somewhat embattled) justification for free speech, it has yet to fully 
incorporate an understanding of institutions.118 Nevertheless, 
 
Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 4, 6 (1990) (“[T]he 
‘law and society idea’ mean[s] the reconceptualization of law in ways that make it amenable to 
study by the social science. . . . [To do so] [w]e have to think of law as a social institution, as 
interacting behaviors, as ritual and symbol, as a reflection of interest group politics, as a form of 
behavior modification, or in some other way that makes it amenable to social scientific 
analysis.”). An institutional law and economics approach would in many ways bridge the law 
and economics and law and society disciplines. See Williamson, supra note 84, at 228–29 
(arguing that Professor Coase’s work “establishes that transaction costs are central to applying a 
law and economics approach to the study of legal rights and economic organization”). 
 113. See, e.g., MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN 
ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 1–2, 71 (Ian Cunnison trans., Norton 1967) (1925) (arguing that gift 
exchange solidifies relationships and creates responsibilities between the giver and receiver). 
 114. See, e.g., ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN 
AMERICAN CITY 315–25 (1961) (analyzing governance in New Haven, Connecticut, and arguing 
that a polyarchy of elite social and economic groups exert formal and informal control); G. 
WILLIAM DOMHOFF, WHO REALLY RULES?: NEW HAVEN AND COMMUNITY POWER 
REEXAMINED 174–75 (1978) (challenging Dahl’s central thesis and arguing inter alia that social 
and business elites overlap, and that the New Haven Chamber of Commerce, Yale University, 
and the largest local bank effectively ruled New Haven). 
 115. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 83, at vii (“I did not appreciate how unimportant law 
can be when I embarked on this project.”). 
 116. Williamson, supra note 12, at 607. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Some scholars wrap a tunic around the marketplace metaphor and call it the “agora,” 
invoking the public places in which Greeks (and later Romans) met to exchange goods and 
ideas. See, e.g., David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment 
Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 894 (1986). The word “agora” is, in fact, Greek for marketplace or 
public square. A little bit of historical shading brings the agora metaphor in line with the 
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Frederick Schauer has begun a quest to describe and define an 
institutionally aware First Amendment. The fast-growing body of 
work he has inspired may provide the basis for a First Amendment 
theory that, like the NIE, accounts for the activity of institutions in 
the marketplace. 
In Professor Schauer’s conception, First Amendment doctrine 
should be—and perhaps has been—attuned to speech institutions, 
giving free speech protection to institutions according to how well 
they vindicate the purposes of the First Amendment.119 Schauer 
summarizes his theory thus: 
. . . I want to suggest that a certain number of existing social 
institutions in general, even if not in every particular, serve functions 
that the First Amendment deems especially important, or may carry 
risks that the First Amendment recognizes as especially dangerous. 
To the extent that this is so, a recast First Amendment could more 
consciously treat these institutions in rulelike fashion, with the 
institutions serving as under- and overinclusive, but not spurious 
markers of deeper background First Amendment values. . . . An 
institutional First Amendment would thus move the inquiry away 
from direct application of the underlying values of the First 
Amendment to the conduct at issue and towards the mediating 
determination of whether the conduct at issue was or was not the 
conduct of one of these institutions.120 
The Institutional First Amendment thus requires courts and scholars 
first to identify the “existing social institutions” that either advance or 
threaten particular First Amendment values—certainly schools and 
the press would qualify—and then pay special attention to the 
boundaries and conduct of those institutions with the understanding 
that institutional features and functions may indicate important First 
Amendment values. Schauer recognizes that this institution-centered 
jurisprudence initially appears to be at odds with a strong guarantee 
 
institutional understanding of the marketplace, because (as any visitor to Athenian ruins can 
testify) the agora itself was populated not just by individuals, but by temples, stoa, and guilds. 
Scholars who embrace the agora metaphor should take note of its infrastructure. 
 119. Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907, 
925 (2006) (“An institutional understanding of the First Amendment is structured around the 
principle that certain institutions play special roles in serving the kinds of values that the First 
Amendment is most plausibly understood to protect.”); Schauer, supra note 2, at 1273–77. 
 120. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1274. 
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of free speech121 because it would require courts to consider the 
identity of a speaker, and perhaps the content of its speech, in 
determining what level of protection that speaker should receive. 
Nevertheless, he argues persuasively that refusing to recognize 
institutional tailoring can also have a “highly distorting effect”:122 
When the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to delineate the 
boundaries of the institutional press produces fewer press rights—in 
particular, rights of access and rights to withhold confidentially 
obtained information—than exist in many countries with a far more 
constricted view of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in 
general, there is some indication of a problem. When we are 
compelled to treat mass distribution of detailed instructions for 
causing harm in the same way that we treat an individual speaking to 
a live audience, we face a different kind of problem: too much 
protection rather than too little.123 
Whether Institutional First Amendment scholarship is 
descriptive or simply normative is a matter of some debate. Schauer 
himself has suggested that the theory may have some descriptive 
accuracy,124 although not as much as it should. He offers Arkansas 
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes125 and National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley126 as examples of cases in which the 
Supreme Court has explicitly relied on institution-specific ideas, thus 
“mov[ing] it closer to a workable approach to managing the free 
speech issues that arise within the government’s own enterprises.”127 
Erwin Chemerinsky and Scott Moss, among others, have argued that 
the Court is actually overly deferential to certain institutions such as 
schools and prisons, and that these institutions may be speech stifling 
 
 121. Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 84, 85–86 (1998). 
 122. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1270–71. 
 123. Id. at 1270–71 (footnotes omitted). 
 124. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration 
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1787 (2004) (“[T]he most logical 
explanation of the actual boundaries of the First Amendment might come less from an 
underlying theory of the First Amendment and more from the political, sociological, cultural, 
historical, psychological, and economic milieu in which the First Amendment exists and out of 
which it has developed.”). 
 125. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
 126. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
 127. Schauer, supra note 121, at 86. 
01__BLOCHER.DOC 4/16/2008  8:29:05 AM 
850 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:821 
rather than speech promoting.128 Schauer’s more recent work, 
however, suggests that the Court has generally avoided the 
institutional approach. He notes that the “American free speech 
doctrine has never been comfortable distinguishing among 
institutions,”129 and that “[w]hile occasional exceptions undoubtedly 
can be found”130—Schauer counts broadcasts and speech in the 
military among them131—“it seems a permissible generalization to 
conclude that First Amendment doctrine has been hesitant to draw 
lines between or among speakers or between or among 
communicative institutions.”132 
Whatever its accuracy as a descriptive matter, Institutional First 
Amendment theory supports the normative notion that courts should 
“defer” to speech—and, perhaps more importantly, speech 
mediation—in certain institutional contexts. Courts should, for 
example, be solicitous of reporters’ speech (and view with a 
suspicious eye any attempts by the government to restrict that 
speech), because the press is a recognizable “institution” whose 
purpose and practice is in line with the purposes of the First 
Amendment. On the other hand, forms of “institutional speech” like 
corporate disclosure statements are not entitled to the same 
 
 128. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 441 (1990) (“The protections provided by the United States 
Constitution apply least where they are needed the most. Throughout American history . . . the 
Supreme Court has adopted a posture of great deference to institutions of government such as 
prisons, the military, schools, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Individuals in 
these institutions have little, if any, protections of their most basic civil liberties.”); Ingber, supra 
note 8, at 4 (1990) (“[W]hile first amendment doctrine has developed so as to expand expressive 
liberty against the state acting as sovereign, Supreme Court opinions over the past decade 
suggest that courts are to defer to . . . the judgments of governmental decision makers when 
regulating expressive activity in institutional contexts such as public employment, school, and 
the military.” (footnotes omitted)); Moss, supra note 18, at 1640 (“By dividing speech rights so 
starkly by institutional context, courts have not just recognized, but in fact overstated, the 
uniqueness of schools, workplaces, and prisons.”). 
 129. Schauer, supra note 121, at 84. 
 130. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1263. 
 131. Id. at 1263 n.43; see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (finding no First 
Amendment right to distribute political literature at a military base); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 
733, 743 (1974) (“While members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted 
by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military 
mission requires a different application of those protections.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 
395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (“Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First 
Amendment interest . . . differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the 
First Amendment standards applied to them.” (citation omitted)). 
 132. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1263. 
01__BLOCHER.DOC 4/16/2008  8:29:05 AM 
2008] NEW INSTITUTIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT 851 
deference because they do not involve the kind of “institution” the 
First Amendment was meant to protect.133 
The following Section proposes a more nuanced and helpful 
conception of “institutions” for First Amendment analysis, one that 
connects institutions to the best-recognized purpose of free speech 
(the marketplace of ideas) and accords institutions First Amendment 
protection based on how well they serve that purpose. 
B. The New Institutional First Amendment 
The marketplace of ideas has not caught up with the economic 
understanding of institutions, and the Institutional First Amendment 
has not incorporated the marketplace of ideas. As a result, the 
common conception of the marketplace of ideas relies on an 
unrealistic view of the market,134 and the Institutional First 
Amendment lacks an overarching theory of which institutions should 
be given special treatment and why.135 This Section attempts to solve 
both problems by proposing a “New Institutional First Amendment” 
that adopts the marketplace of ideas as its animating metaphor but 
incorporates the NIE understanding of institutions as transaction 
cost–reducing market enhancers. 
1. An Economic Approach to the Institutional First Amendment.  
The New Institutional account of the First Amendment suggests that 
for the same reasons that economists defer to institutions that 
promote the economic market, judges should defer to institutions that 
promote the marketplace of ideas. The New Institutional First 
Amendment, like the New Institutional Economics, evaluates 
 
 133. See Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional 
Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 674 (2006) (“An institutional 
approach seems to provide significant principled grounds for permitting greater speech 
regulation, at least when applied in the realm of securities litigation.”). 
 134. Institutions have made a few cameo appearances in earlier discussions of the 
marketplace of ideas. E.g., Ingber, supra note 7, at 27 (“Conflicts in the marketplace, therefore, 
are not likely to lead to conclusive agreement on what is ‘true’ or ‘best.’ Rather the marketplace 
serves as a forum where cultural groups with differing needs, interests, and experiences battle to 
defend or establish their disparate senses of what is ‘true’ or ‘best.’”); see also id. at 85 n.416 
(describing how the social perspectives that mold free speech are themselves products of the 
“[e]cological setting, . . . [which] includes the concepts of history and cultural development”). 
 135. See Lee C. Bollinger, Public Institutions of Culture and the First Amendment: The New 
Frontier, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1103, 1117 (1995) (“It is tempting to try to resolve which institutions 
are entitled to autonomy by using history or ‘tradition’ as the dividing line . . . . But this is just as 
inadequate for this purpose as it is in the public forum area.”). 
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institutions by how well they advance the marketplace—the 
underlying question that courts and scholars have asked of individual 
speech acts ever since Abrams. By adding an institutional awareness, 
the New Institutional First Amendment captures the descriptive and 
normative power of Professor Schauer’s theory and also weds it to a 
familiar animating principle. 
New Institutional Economics scholars see institutions as social 
constructs that, among other things, reduce transaction costs and 
contribute to an efficient market. NIE theory thus demands not only 
that economists look to the preferences of individuals in the market, 
but also that they understand the institutions that shape the 
underlying market. When those institutions are market enhancing—
and NIE theorists believe that they often are—legal reformers should 
treat them with deference. In other words, strong institutions may be 
better for the market than state-directed legal reform. The role of 
speech institutions as market enhancers provides the necessary link 
between the marketplace of ideas view of free speech and the 
Institutional First Amendment view advanced by Schauer and 
others.136 Just as institutions in the NIE framework improve the 
market by facilitating the flow of goods and services, speech 
institutions improve the marketplace of ideas by facilitating the flow 
of ideas. 
But of course this puts the institutional cart before the 
transaction cost horse. The reason the NIE accords special treatment 
to institutions, after all, is that they play an important role in 
minimizing transaction costs. It may well be that there are 
“institutions” in both the real-world economy and in the marketplace 
of ideas, but are they really parallel concepts?137 Is it even possible to 
conceptualize “transaction costs” in the marketplace of ideas? And 
do speech institutions reduce transaction costs in the same way as 
economic institutions? Fortunately for the New Institutional First 
Amendment, the answer to all three of these questions is yes. 
 
 136. Although it is possible to “embrace the First Amendment because it promotes the 
value of the marketplace of ideas as a facilitator of the search for truth,” Schauer, supra note 2, 
at 1268–69, Professor Schauer explicitly does not do so, id. at 1269 n.71. 
 137. Cf. Mark D. Rosen, Institutional Context in Constitutional Law: A Critical Examination 
of Term Limits, Judicial Campaign Codes, and Anti-Pornography Ordinances, 21 J.L. & POL. 
223, 244–45 (2005) (identifying, without seeking to answer, the difficult question of “what 
societal institutions properly play a role in determining whether free speech principles are to be 
Tailored”). 
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To begin with, the concept of institutions is similar enough to 
enable useful comparison. In NIE theory, institutions are socially 
created constructs that mediate interactions between market 
participants by providing a background of social norms and 
agreements to govern transactions even in the absence of formal law. 
In the New Institutional First Amendment, institutions are 
preexisting social constructs that mediate communication even in the 
absence of formal speech regulation by the government. The two 
conceptions are nearly identical. For the most part, in fact, speech 
institutions are not just the equivalent of economic institutions, but a 
subcategory within them. Most speech institutions are embedded 
institutions like social norms governing public speech or educational 
customs and traditions, many of which lower the cost of information 
exchange. Journalistic norms protecting the confidentiality of sources, 
for example, may improve the flow and quality of ideas in the 
marketplace. Other speech institutions—like public schools and a 
state-protected or state-supported press—are perhaps more 
susceptible to state-centered change. 
Just as the definition of institution is consistent between the NIE 
and New Institutional First Amendment theories, so too does the 
concept of transaction costs travel easily between them. The exchange 
of ideas is what creates the competition that makes the marketplace 
of ideas an attractive and effective explanatory metaphor for how 
good ideas win out over weak ones. But the exchange of ideas, like 
the exchange of goods and services, is not perfectly costless. Indeed, 
many basic transaction costs—those associated with the search for 
and understanding of information, for example—have even more 
salience in the market for ideas than they do in the market for goods. 
They are, in effect, transaction costs that relate only to information 
exchange. 
Returning to Professor Coase’s four categories of transaction 
costs—search, negotiation, measurement, and enforcement138—some 
parallels are immediately apparent. The search for good ideas, for 
example, can be just as costly as the search for good products and 
services. Both kinds of search require individuals to expend time and 
energy seeking the best product or idea. Sometimes these search costs 
are easily quantifiable. Money spent on consumer reports is a search 
cost, as is the cost of books or school tuition that enable individuals to 
 
 138. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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find “truth” in the marketplace of ideas. Other search costs may be 
both more sizeable and harder to measure. The difficulty of finding or 
evaluating ideas, for example, is a type of search cost, one that is 
pervasive and falls unequally on individuals depending on their 
resources and cognitive abilities. Indeed, Professor Williamson 
reports that “[t]here is close to unanimity within the NIE on the idea 
of limited cognitive competence—often referred to as bounded 
rationality.”139 Such limited ability—whether the result of limited 
education, the influence of the government and elites on the market, 
or some other factor—makes it difficult for individuals to be good 
“buyers” of ideas.140 And as Justice Brennan recognized, “It would be 
a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”141 
Search costs are not the only kinds of transaction costs that 
appear both in the real-world market and in the marketplace of ideas. 
Negotiation and measurement costs can be usefully conceptualized as 
the time and energy spent debating and reaching a resolution about 
which of competing ideas is better. Speakers with competing 
conceptions of the good “negotiate” when they try to convince each 
other of the merits of their positions, and they “measure” when they 
compare the relative strength of those positions. Like search costs, 
measuring the quality of an idea is an exercise requiring cognitive 
resources—a very real cost, and one that not every market participant 
is equally able to pay. 
A simple example, one that invokes the marketplace of ideas 
metaphor within a real-world market setting, may help illustrate how 
the concept of transaction costs applies with equal force whether one 
is talking about the exchange of goods or the exchange of ideas. A 
shopper is considering two similar products. The products are 
comparable, but differently priced, and the packaging of each 
contains various claims about the product—“Delicious!” or 
“Removes stains!” or “New fragrance!”—some of which are harder to 
verify than others. Deciding between the two products, and deciding 
which claims to believe, is an exercise that imposes both 
informational and real-world costs. 
The discerning shopper, hoping to choose the product that will 
maximize her utility, might consult Consumer Reports for a review of 
 
 139. Williamson, supra note 12, at 600. 
 140. See Ingber, supra note 7, at 71–84. 
 141. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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the products, ask friends or store employees, or spend a few moments 
comparing the products’ ingredients and claims. These activities 
represent very real costs to the shopper. They are the sand in the 
gears of the supposedly frictionless economic machine. If the cost of 
this information exceeds the likely gain in utility from selecting the 
right product, the shopper will simply act on imperfect information, 
perhaps failing to choose the product that would make her most 
happy. The time and money she wastes on the wrong product is both 
a “real” cost and an opportunity cost. Only if she knew immediately 
and costlessly which product she wanted (in fact, only if she did not 
have to go to the store at all), would the costless, perfect market 
transacting of the neoclassical model play out in real life. But if she 
does not find the product she seeks, or cannot sort through the 
product claims and choose the one that will maximize her utility, then 
transaction costs will have prevented an otherwise efficient result. 
Depending on how costs fall, the best product, like the “truth” in 
Holmes’s marketplace, will not always rise to the top. 
For all the same reasons that the shopper’s costly conundrum can 
be conceptualized as a consequence of transaction costs in the “real-
world” economic market, it also illustrates the transaction costs that 
exist in the marketplace of ideas. The product’s packaging claims are 
a form of speech142—an “idea” that Holmes imagined competing with 
others. The shopper pays real costs when she tries to “consume” that 
idea, because to assess its “truth” she must first speak to a 
knowledgeable friend or a store employee about the products’ 
relative merits, or weigh the reliability of the information she 
receives. As her situation demonstrates, competition between ideas is 
rarely if ever costless, and is therefore imperfect. 
2. The Role of Institutions in the New Institutional First 
Amendment.  Because the concepts of “institution” and “transaction 
 
 142. For the purposes of the present analysis, I hold aside the question of whether under 
contemporary doctrine the “speech” embodied in these product claims is entitled to 
constitutional protection. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (suggesting that commercial speech is that which does 
“no more than propose a commercial transaction” (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973))); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, 
Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 628 (1990) (arguing that commercial 
speech should receive full First Amendment protection). The relevant point here is that 
analyzing product claims, whether or not they are constitutionally protected, requires the 
expenditure of mental and sometimes “real” resources. 
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cost” both translate so well between NIE and the New Institutional 
First Amendment theory, the final question must be whether speech 
institutions, like their economic cousins, actually lower transaction 
costs.143 It is this function, after all, that entitles institutions to 
deference from economic or legal reformers. And with one important 
qualification—that the answer is fundamentally an empirical one that 
requires a rich understanding of how institutions function in the real 
world—the answer to this final, crucial question also seems to be yes. 
The institutional approach, in both real-world economics and First 
Amendment “economics,” demands a thick understanding of real-
world phenomena and institutions, an understanding that 
marketplace of ideas theorists have not developed.144 The remainder 
of this Section, however, offers some general observations about the 
role of “speech institutions” in reducing the transaction costs of 
communication. Part III then addresses in more detail the roles of 
two specific speech institutions—schools and universities—in 
lowering transaction costs and how First Amendment doctrine 
accommodates those roles. 
As explained in Part I.B, institutions in the NIE framework exist 
at least in part to lower “transaction costs,” and economists have 
filled bookshelves explaining how they do so. First Amendment 
scholars have not yet responded with a comparable theory of the role 
of speech institutions in mediating the “transaction costs” of 
information exchange. Indeed, even discussions of the marketplace of 
ideas generally do not characterize communication difficulties as 
transaction costs.145 Nevertheless, it appears that some speech 
institutions—like their NIE counterparts—do lower the transaction 
 
 143. One possible implication of this theory is that institutions grow in influence and utility 
as transaction costs rise. The higher those costs become, the more important institutions can be 
as mediators of transactions and contributors to overall efficiency. If true, this proposition 
would suggest that certain developments that have reduced the transaction costs in the 
marketplace for ideas—the Internet, Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1666 (“In cyberspace, barriers to 
entry are low and no greater for speakers than listeners.”), and education generally—may 
undermine the importance of other institutions (such as gossip and superstition) that owe their 
influence to the fact that they reduce the costs of information exchange. 
 144. Frederick Schauer, Discourse and Its Discontents, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309, 1333 
(1997) (“A great deal of free speech theory and a great deal of discourse theory is marked by an 
admirable epistemological optimism, but whether that epistemological optimism is well-founded 
is in the final analysis an empirical question, as to which the resources of contemporary social 
science research might help to locate an answer.”). 
 145. See supra notes 39–57 and accompanying text. 
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costs of information exchange and are thus entitled to deference from 
lawmakers. 
Universities and the press are perhaps the easiest examples, 
given their unique and well-recognized roles in the marketplace of 
ideas. Universities lower information search costs by making ideas 
and information widely available and more easily accessible. They 
also lower search and measurement costs for students and faculty by 
equipping them with better analytic tools with which to evaluate new 
ideas. In the marketplace of ideas, a sharp and critical mind is the 
equivalent of a good eye for quality goods and services in the real-
world market. Both make it easier for consumers (whether of ideas or 
products) to determine which of many options best suits them. 
Similarly, the institutional press improves the marketplace of 
ideas by serving as a clearinghouse for information. This, too, lowers 
search costs and makes ideas more easily accessible for consumption 
or rejection by individual idea consumers. The American press has 
played a particularly important role in explaining and distributing 
information about other institutions whose functioning would 
otherwise be impossible for the average citizen to follow. Without 
active and critical reporting about government, for example, it would 
be impossible for citizens to cast informed votes,146 and the politicians 
they elect could hardly claim to be triumphant in the marketplace of 
ideas. 
The deeper the analysis, the more obvious the parallels between 
speech institutions and market institutions become. In both scenarios, 
institutions made up of repeat players are more likely to have 
communication-enhancing norms.147 Just like market actors, repeat 
speech players are less likely to violate norms, lie, or break promises, 
because they know that repeat interactions are inevitable. Institutions 
such as universities regularize these relationships, allowing individuals 
 
 146. Whether voters actually do cast informed votes is a matter of some debate. Bryan 
Caplan has argued that rational consumers often make for irrational voters. See BRYAN 
CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES 
3 (2007) (“Voter irrationality is precisely what economic theory implies once we adopt 
introspectively plausible assumptions about human motivation. . . . [D]emocracy has a built-in 
externality. . . . Since most of the cost of voter irrationality is external . . . why not indulge?”). 
 147. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, 23 
J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1980). The canonical study is by Clifford Geertz. Geertz, supra note 100, at 
30–31 (arguing that traders in a North African bazaar lessen search and negotiation costs 
through a process of “clientelization,” which occurs through repeated face-to-face interactions 
between buyer and seller). 
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within those institutions to “transact” ideas more cheaply. To take 
just one example, a professor may be a more efficient communicator 
of information precisely because that professor (or the institution of 
which the professor is a part) has a reputation for imparting accurate 
information. Those who hear a well-known professor give a lecture 
on cell biology, or President Nixon’s economy, or the First 
Amendment, feel less of a duty to “double-check” the information 
they are receiving than they would if a random person on a street 
corner were shouting the very same lecture. The trust the listeners 
place in the information they receive saves them from having to pay 
what could otherwise be substantial information costs. 
Moreover, it is important to recognize that transaction costs are 
paid not just by those trying to find good ideas, but by those trying to 
spread them. And although the cost of receiving information may be 
high, the cost of transmitting it is often even higher. By forming and 
joining groups, individuals can defray the costs of communication and 
more effectively direct their ideas into the marketplace.148 In this way, 
institutions mitigate the cost of selling ideas as well as the cost of 
purchasing them. 
Speech institutions like universities and schools can improve the 
marketplace of ideas by lowering the transaction costs of information 
exchange. Doing so may at times require them to regulate their own 
members’ speech, as when newspapers require reporters to back up 
articles with quotes and research, or when schools require teachers to 
cover certain subject matters. These internal restrictions, although 
occasionally limiting the speech of individual actors (such as 
journalists and teachers), preserve the ability of the institutions 
themselves to enhance the marketplace of ideas and their members’ 
ability to participate in it.149 Just as economic institutions’ self-
 
 148. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective 
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably 
enhanced by group association . . . .”). Interestingly, one can see a political predecessor of this 
economic theory in the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, who noted that “nothing . . . deserves 
more attention” than Americans’ propensity to join “intellectual and moral associations.” 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 488 (J.P. Mayer & Max Jerner eds., 
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835). These “free institutions,” in de 
Tocqueville’s view, help to “combat the effects of individualism.” Id. at 481. 
 149. Hafen, supra note 8, at 686 (“Indeed, as the Court is beginning to note, personal rights 
may take ongoing sustenance from certain forms of institutional nurturing.”); see also Corp. of 
the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342–44 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“Solicitude for a church’s ability to [engage in self-definition] reflects the idea that furtherance 
of the autonomy of religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as well.”). 
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regulating norms sometimes promote overall efficiency in the 
marketplace for goods and services, speech institutions’ internal 
regulation often improves the ability of the marketplace of ideas to 
find truth. Alvin Goldman and James Cox point out that “[d]omains 
of opinion where speech is totally unregulated, or is at most regulated 
by the market, are arguably the domains where maximum error and 
falsity are to be found.”150 These are the domains “in which rumor, 
gossip, old-wives’ tales, and superstition flourish.”151 On the other 
hand, there are “certain forums for scientific and scholarly speech 
that are highly regulated, and which, nonetheless, are responsible for 
what many people take to be the greatest amount of knowledge.”152 
Other institutions, however, may not be so conducive to the 
transmission of ideas.153 Like the economic institutions studied by NIE 
scholars, not all speech institutions receive special treatment, nor 
should they. And even those speech institutions that are accorded 
special status under the First Amendment can effectively forfeit that 
status when they—or, as explained in Section B.3,154 the organizations 
that populate them—apply their rules capriciously or in a way that 
undermines the market.155 After all, it is the market-enhancing quality 
of institutions that entitles them to deference in the first place. The 
difficult question is how to separate the good institutions—those that 
advance the market (whether it be in goods or ideas)—from the bad. 
That question is impossible to answer without a conception of free 
expression and why it is valuable. The New Institutional First 
Amendment provides that missing piece by wedding the Institutional 
First Amendment to the metaphor that has guided First Amendment 
jurisprudence for nearly a century: the marketplace of ideas. To the 
degree that speech institutions serve that market—the same question 
courts have been asking of individual speech regulations since 1919—
they should be entitled to deference from lawmakers, just as the 
 
 150. Goldman & Cox, supra note 42, at 12. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 13. 
 153. Dale Carpenter, Response, The Value of Institutions and the Values of Free Speech, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1407 (2005) (“Some institutions are better First Amendment citizens than 
others. If we want a robust First Amendment, why should we be blind to that?”). 
 154. See infra text accompanying notes 160–64. 
 155. Cf. Cooter, supra note 108, at 1684 (“The state cannot justify enforcing a norm that 
harms one community on the grounds that it arose from a consensual process in another 
community.”). 
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institutions in the NIE framework are entitled to deference from 
economists. 
3. The Crucial Difference between Speech Institutions and 
Speech Organizations.  The discussion thus far has focused mainly on 
speech institutions that advance the marketplace of ideas. There are 
also many institutions that do not. Perhaps the most significant 
criticism of the Institutional First Amendment is that it is “blind to 
whether the preferred institution is actually serving important free 
speech interests in a given case.”156 What happens when otherwise 
“good” institutions apply their internal rules in a way that does not 
advance the marketplace of ideas? Does an educational institution—
which would otherwise be entitled to great deference from courts—
still get deference when it limits speech for reasons unrelated to the 
marketplace of ideas? 
Fortunately, the New Institutional First Amendment, drawing 
again from NIE theory, offers an answer to that question. The key lies 
in the distinction between institutions—which Professor North 
identifies as the rules of the game, including norms and customs157—
and organizations, which he identifies as the players in that game.158 
The problem usually arises when certain organizations fail to live up 
to their speech-promoting institutional norms. 
Despite the usual labeling of them as such, individual 
universities, schools, and newspapers are not “institutions” in the NIE 
(and thus New Institutional First Amendment) sense. Whereas the 
university system is akin to an institution, individual colleges and 
universities are more akin to organizations.159 To be sure, they have an 
especially close relationship with the larger institutional structure and 
are “governed” by its norms. This, after all, is what entitles 
organizations (like institutions) to some level of deference in their 
speech-related decisions. But unlike institutions—which are generally 
too diffuse to be subject to the whims of dominant individuals—
organizations are subject to capture and may end up limiting speech 
 
 156. Carpenter, supra note 153, at 1414. 
 157. See supra notes 80, 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
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in ways that advance the interests of the individuals who control 
them, but do not improve the marketplace of ideas.160 
More often that not, overly strict limits on speech are a result of 
organizations misapplying institutional norms. In such a situation, no 
deference is due. Take the example of a university that refuses to 
allow Christian speakers on campus. Such decisions, when made for 
“academic” reasons, generally receive broad deference from courts, a 
deference that can be justified by the unique role of universities as 
marketplace-of-ideas-enhancing institutions.161 Holding aside any 
Free Exercise or Establishment Clause issues,162 the university might 
try to justify the exclusion of Christian speakers by claiming that 
religious discourse does not contribute to the search for “truth.” The 
argument could even be couched in the marketplace-enhancing 
function that justifies universities’ special First Amendment 
treatment. But without more, it should—and likely would—fail under 
the New Institutional First Amendment, because such a broad 
exclusion of speakers seems on its face to limit the marketplace rather 
than advance it. Even giving some deference to the university’s 
alleged interpretation of its institutional norms, a court would likely 
see the appeal to the marketplace of ideas as pretextual at best. The 
same reasoning would probably apply if a university’s administration 
bowed to the wishes of rich donors who demanded, for political 
reasons, the firing of a certain controversial professor. Other 
nonacademic reasons might lead a university to ban speakers who 
applaud (or criticize) Israeli military policy. Such a decision, whatever 
its merits, would effectively limit the marketplace of ideas, which is 
the very concept that entitles universities to special First Amendment 
treatment in the first place.163 When this happens—when groups flout 
 
 160. There is perhaps a tenuous analogy here to corporate corruption, in that institutions (or 
organizations) can sometimes stray from the purposes for which they were established—and 
which their members/shareholders support—and instead pursue the interests of a few dominant 
elites. See generally Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1663 (“Put another way, speech intermediaries that 
exceed the function of norm-reflection and stray into norm-creation, on this view, cross over a 
public/private boundary and begin to resemble governments.”). 
 161. See infra Part III.B. 
 162. E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 
(1995) (holding on free speech grounds that a public university could not refuse to fund certain 
student publications that expressed belief in a deity, and that the university’s need to comply 
with the Establishment Clause did not cure the violation). 
 163. The same argument about principled distinctions applies with full force to the 
designation of institutions in the first place. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First 
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 294 (1981) (“The point I wish to 
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the rules that justify their special treatment—there is little reason for 
courts to defer to the misapplication of their own norms.164 
Determining whether an organization is misapplying its institutional 
norms would, of course, require courts to investigate the content and 
application of those norms. But that would be no more difficult a task 
than their responsibility to investigate, for example, whether a 
particular limitation on speech amounts to viewpoint discrimination. 
The same questions arise in NIE scholarship, and the same 
solution applies. Customary law, for example, is an institution that is 
commonly accorded deference in property relations, and NIE 
theorists frequently argue that customary arrangements should not be 
disturbed by formal law. But when customary authorities—tribal 
leaders, for example165—stop living up to the market-enhancing norms 
they have established, or when those norms are applied to 
disadvantage a particular social group (often women) instead of 
advancing the market as a whole, no deference is due. 
This distinction between organizations and institutions 
complicates the “deference” for which this Article has argued. 
Deference to institutional norms is easy enough to explain and 
defend, but how should courts treat organizations’ interpretations of 
institutional norms? For example, if a university bars speakers who 
are critical (or laudatory) of the Israeli military, and the university 
claims that it has done so on academic grounds, how should a court 
respond? Such “academic” decisions are generally entitled to the 
special, institutional First Amendment treatment accorded to 
universities. But what if the would-be speakers claim that their 
exclusion was based not on a market-enhancing academic decision, 
but on nonacademic factors such as administrators’ personal 
preferences, or viewpoint discrimination? 
 
make is that the creation of a category must be justified by reasons underlying the features 
distinguishing that category from others. When those reasons are not applied in all cases in 
which they are, by their own terms, applicable, then the attempt to create a category has 
misfired.”); see also id. at 307 (“The risk of misapplication of numerous subcategories leads us to 
eschew subcategories within the first amendment, avoiding them even when a distinction seems 
justifiable.”). 
 164. Posner, supra note 96, at 160 (“In the case of groups that engage in undesirable 
behavior, however, courts should not use legal sanctions to promote solidarity. Courts should 
instead interfere so as to inhibit the group’s undesirable norms.”). 
 165. Blocher, supra note 100, at 192–201 (arguing that customary property arrangements 
should be respected but also shaped so as to preserve the property interests of disempowered 
groups such as women and migrants). 
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Such situations present a difficult question that might be likened 
to a dispute over the “standard of review” applicable to 
organizations’ interpretations of institutional norms. The example 
here involves institutional norms that are generally entitled to 
deference (academic decisions, which usually advance the 
marketplace of ideas) and the interpretation of those norms by an 
intermediary organization (the school’s apparent determination that 
academic principles bar the presence of certain speakers). Are the 
latter organizations’ interpretations of these norms entitled to 
deference as against courts’ interpretations, just as institutional norms 
themselves are entitled to deference as against statutory law? The 
answer can only be yes. As with agency interpretations of their own 
regulations,166 organizations’ interpretations of their animating 
institutional norms should be entitled to deference.167 The precise 
level of deference may vary among institutions or organizations, but 
in any case the burden will fall on the party challenging the norm to 
show that the organization has misapplied it. 
4. Apparent Weaknesses and Unexpected Strengths.  The 
distinction between organizations and institutions is not the only line-
drawing complication raised by the New Institutional First 
Amendment. Separating organizations from institutions is a difficult 
task, to be sure, but it may be simpler than separating those that are 
“public” from those that are “private.”168 Only those institutions that 
 
 166. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45, 865–
66 (1984) (describing the circumstances under which courts should defer to agencies’ reasonable 
interpretations of their own regulations). 
 167. Although he does not address the difference between organizations and institutions, 
Professor Schauer suggests that organizations are entitled to deference even when they 
misapply the institutional norms that justify their special treatment. See Schauer, supra note 2, 
at 1273 n.87 (“I am [concerned] with the identification of concrete and preexisting cultural 
institutions that might in the large serve important free speech functions, and which thus might 
be deserving of constitutionally guaranteed autonomy as institutions, even when they do not 
serve the purposes grounding the recognition of their institutional autonomy in the first 
instance.”). 
 168. Courts have struggled with this public/private distinction. Compare Robins v. 
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (upholding the state’s power to grant high 
school students the right to seek signatures for a political petition on the grounds of a private 
shopping center, despite the owner’s assertion of his First Amendment right to disassociate from 
their speech or cause), and Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 
Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313 (1968) (holding that union picketing of a private shopping center was 
entitled to First Amendment protection), with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520–21 (1976) 
(denying First Amendment protection to employees seeking to picket inside a privately owned 
01__BLOCHER.DOC 4/16/2008  8:29:05 AM 
864 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:821 
have some element of state action are relevant for constitutional 
purposes, given that only they are subject to the First Amendment. 
But speech institutions do not respect the distinction between public 
and private that marks the outer edge of the First Amendment’s 
coverage.169 
Somewhat ironically, then, the New Institutional First 
Amendment’s focus on institutions, most of which are private, 
highlights the fact that most speech regulation is beyond the law’s 
reach. By doing so, the theory actually makes a far more important 
contribution, by highlighting the fact that institutions, rather than the 
state, are the primary regulators of speech. The most powerful—
though perhaps not the most obvious—speech “regulations” are 
social norms and mores, backed by the threat of social ostracism or 
sanction.170 Most speakers fear not prosecution nor exclusion from 
public forums, but approbation and ostracism from friends, family 
members, employers, and fellow citizens. It seems likely, for example, 
that more racist speech is deterred by social norms (many of them 
internalized) than by any formal legal rules.171 By drawing attention to 
these speech-governing institutional norms, the New Institutional 
 
mall), and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (refusing to grant First Amendment 
protection to private parties distributing political leaflets at a private shopping center). 
 169. This point applies mostly to what Professor Williamson refers to as Level One 
“embedded” institutions. See Williamson, supra note 12, at 596–97 (defining Level One 
Institutions as those in which “norms, customs, mores, traditions, etc. are located”). Level Two 
and Three Institutions, however, such as the government bureaucracy and court-centered 
dispute resolution, are products of state law and thus fall within state action doctrine. The 
public/private distinction—extended along the spectrum of institutions—is particularly difficult 
to apply in the context of colleges and universities, which I consider in more detail in Part III. 
Indeed, “private and public institutions of higher learning share so many characteristics that 
distinguishing between them threatens to be rigidly formalistic.” Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. 
Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There 
Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1574 (1998) (footnote omitted). 
 170. Ingber stresses the degree to which the government controls this “socialization,” for 
example, through the “indoctrination” that occurs in public schools. Ingber, supra note 7, at 28–
29. Although not discounting the degree to which the state can influence the socialization, 
especially through schools, I believe that the majority of social norms and mores are beyond the 
reach of the state. 
 171. See Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Autumn 
1989, at 99, 104 (arguing that internalized norms are often followed even when their violation 
would go undetected by society); Katz, supra note 79, at 1750 (“[A]n important feature of social 
norms is their tendency to be internalized by group members.”) (footnote omitted). Of course, 
not all speakers are dissuaded by social sanction, and some provocateurs may actively seek it 
out. 
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First Amendment paints a broader and more accurate picture of what 
“free speech” actually means. 
Holmes’s theory suggests that government regulation is the only 
impediment to a free marketplace of ideas. But the New Institutional 
First Amendment demonstrates that, as in economic markets, the 
alternative to regulation by government is regulation by institutions.172 
The lawyerly obsession with the state action requirement obscures 
the fact that only a very small part of the marketplace of ideas is 
public.173 Contrary to the implications of Holmes’s theory, the absence 
of state regulation does not automatically create a perfect free market 
for ideas any more than it creates a perfect, frictionless economic 
market. First Amendment theories that are limited to the small public 
corner of the market involving state action may give a full account of 
the Constitution’s domain, but they do not even come close to 
describing the marketplace of ideas. That marketplace is largely 
private, and it is privately regulated. It exists in homes, malls, bars, 
workplaces, and schools, governed by private norms and rules. And 
although these areas of the market are largely beyond the reach of 
the Constitution, they are not beyond—in fact they are part and 
parcel of—free speech institutions. A theory that recognizes this, as 
the New Institutional First Amendment does, paints a richer picture 
of the marketplace of ideas. 
One might argue, however, that if institutions are entitled to 
deference with regard to the content of their norms, then they should 
also be responsible for enforcing those norms. On this reading, a 
university could set its own speech code, but could not call on the 
power of the state to expel those who violate it. But as Eric Posner 
points out, “[A]lthough solidary groups obtain and process most 
kinds of information more effectively than courts, their nonlegal 
sanctions are sometimes less powerful than the courts’ legal 
sanctions.”174 Thus private institutions may be unable to enforce their 
own norms, even when those norms are more efficient than state-
 
 172. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 1641, 1678 (1967) (“With the development of private restraints on free expression, the 
idea of a free marketplace where ideas can compete on their merits has become just as 
unrealistic in the twentieth century as the economic theory of perfect competition. The world in 
which an essentially rationalist philosophy of the first amendment was born has vanished and 
what was rationalism is now romance.”). 
 173. For a discussion of the pitfalls of state action doctrine, especially as it applies to the 
First Amendment, see Eule & Varat, supra note 169, at 1543–54. 
 174. Posner, supra note 96, at 157. 
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created alternatives. In such situations, court intervention may be 
necessary to maintain the efficient norms. Any awkwardness in using 
courts to identify and apply what are nominally the institution’s own 
norms is no more troubling than using courts to enforce private 
contracts, or to determine and apply “immanent business norms.”175 
Deference to the content of an institution’s norms is justified by the 
efficient development of those norms. But in some circumstances the 
enforcement of these norms can be performed more easily by the 
state, just as with state-backed enforcement of other private 
agreements. 
One might object that this demands too much of courts, which 
are better suited to deal with formal legal doctrine than with messy 
institutional realities.176 As Professor Schauer puts it, “For too many 
judges, it seems, delineating the contours of such [speech] institutions 
would look like a rather unjudicial enterprise.”177 But even Schauer’s 
critics allow that “the possible line-drawing difficulties do not seem 
that much more difficult than other line-drawing problems in the First 
Amendment.”178 Indeed, contemporary doctrine requires judges to 
draw difficult (and perhaps impossible) lines between government 
speech, commercial speech, and other judicially created categories.179 
The final Part of this Article considers in more detail the New 
Institutional First Amendment’s ability to describe the doctrine 
surrounding two particularly important First Amendment 
institutions—schools and universities—and suggests how it might 
contribute to a more coherent commercial speech doctrine. But for 
now it suffices to say that one of the strengths of the theory is that it is 
not only coherent and normative, but that it demands no more of 
courts than they already do. In many cases, deferring to community 
norms may not even require courts to identify those norms at all. For 
example, First Amendment doctrine already requires courts to defer 
 
 175. See Bernstein, supra note 103, at 1820 (identifying “a number of undesirable effects on 
commercial relationships between merchants created by the [Uniform Commercial] Code’s 
search for immanent business norms”). 
 176. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1259 (“Much of this reluctance stems from a view about 
the functions and comparative advantage of the courts. If courts are thought to have little ability 
to fathom the changeable and empirical foundations of our institutional lives, then there is an 
extraordinarily strong temptation to draw doctrinal lines on the basis of ‘principle’ rather than 
‘policy.’”). 
 177. Id. at 1266. 
 178. Carpenter, supra note 153, at 1408. 
 179. I have argued elsewhere that such line drawing is impossible. Joseph Blocher, School 
Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96 GEO. L.J. 1, 57 (2007). 
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in a wide variety of ways to community norms, which are themselves a 
kind of institution. Obscenity cases are perhaps the most obvious 
example, as the Supreme Court has held that “obscenity is to be 
determined by applying ‘contemporary community standards.’”180 
But even if courts are able to accurately identify and properly 
defer to a particular institution’s norms, giving or denying deference 
to those norms might have unexpected effects on the institution or on 
the balance of power between institutions.181 Denying an institution 
the power to regulate its members’ speech, for example, could 
undermine the institution’s cohesiveness, and even limit its ability to 
contribute to the marketplace of ideas.182 Perhaps more intriguing, 
however, the level of First Amendment deference institutions receive 
is likely to influence the institutions’ success in the marketplace of 
ideas. The recent controversy over commercial speech in Kasky v. 
Nike183 provides an illustrative example. Kasky began when a number 
of private citizens and journalists began criticizing Nike for allegedly 
abusing workers in overseas sweatshops. Nike responded by 
publishing a series of “editorial advertisements,” press releases, and 
letters sent to newspapers and universities.184 Mark Kasky, a private 
citizen, alleged that Nike’s information campaign contained false and 
misleading statements made “with knowledge or reckless disregard of 
the laws of California prohibiting false and misleading statements.”185 
He also argued that Nike’s public relations campaign, even though it 
was a response to his own fully protected speech, was actually 
“commercial” speech not entitled to full First Amendment 
protection.186 The California Supreme Court agreed.187 The United 
 
 180. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973). 
 181. See Posner, supra note 96, at 134–35. 
 182. Id. at 136 (arguing that certain kinds of regulation can have “perverse results,” 
including undermining self-regulation). 
 183. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003), 
cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
 184. Thomas C. Goldstein, Nike v. Kasky and the Definition of “Commercial Speech,” 2002–
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 63, 65, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2003/commercial 
speech.pdf. 
 185. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248. 
 186. Id. at 247. There was precedent for his assertion. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980) (finding a difference between “direct 
comments on public issues” and statements about public policy “made only in the context of 
commercial transactions”); see also infra Part III.C. 
 187. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247. See generally Tamara R. Piety, Free Advertising: The Case for 
Public Relations as Commercial Speech, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 367, 369 (2006) (discussing 
01__BLOCHER.DOC 4/16/2008  8:29:05 AM 
868 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:821 
States Supreme Court granted188—and later controversially 
dismissed189—certiorari, sparking two written dissents190 and a 
collective sigh of disappointment from First Amendment scholars.191 
Although it was not explicitly premised on any institutional 
favoritism, Kasky illustrated the stakes. If commercial institutions are 
not entitled to full First Amendment protection, they are at a 
competitive disadvantage in the marketplace of ideas when pitted 
against institutions—such as political groups or universities—that do 
receive such protection. 
Nor is the New Institutional First Amendment a perfect answer 
to all “economic” objections to the marketplace of ideas metaphor. 
The addition of institutions does not change the fact that the 
marketplace metaphor is particularly attractive for those with power 
in the real-world market, because they are more likely to have the 
“economic, social, political, psychological, and cultural resources” to 
dominate in both spheres.192 Moreover, Robert Cooter has suggested 
that economic norms are entitled to deference only when they arise 
from an efficient incentive structure—open competition with few 
“externalities” imposed on nonmembers of the institution.193 But as 
Professor Schauer points out, many areas of constitutionally 
protected speech effectively require those harmed by such speech to 
bear the costs (whether mental or “real,” as for therapy or to avoid 
hateful speakers) of benefits that accrue to the speaker.194 These 
 
Nike v. Kasky and arguing that “the commercial speech doctrine would be better served by 
applying it to all marketing-related speech, including public relations”). 
 188. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099, 1099 (2003). 
 189. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003). 
 190. Id. at 665 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 191. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Landmark Free-Speech Case 
That Wasn’t: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1018 (2004) (“But alas, 
Justice Stevens and his two colleagues could do no more than offer conflicted hints on how they 
might rule in a Nike-like case.”); Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the Running-but-Going-
Nowhere Commercial Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 383, 385 (2005) (noting “the 
absence of any meaningful consensus regarding what is or is not commercial speech or how it 
ought to be treated”). 
 192. Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 935, 951 (1993). Professor Carpenter takes the point even further, suggesting that the very 
recognition of institutions that receive First Amendment treatment will be colored by the 
preferences of the elites with the power to make that determination. Carpenter, supra note 153, 
at 1411 (“[T]he institutions favored by courts and even academics will tend to be traditional 
ones.”). 
 193. Cooter, supra note 108, at 1695. 
 194. Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1321–24 (1992). 
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particular kinds of market failure—externalities and closed access to 
markets—are not necessarily corrected by an institutionally aware 
First Amendment any more than they are by contemporary First 
Amendment doctrine. 
Finally, one might point to the apparent irony that under the 
New Institutional First Amendment, institutions such as universities 
that are committed to improving the marketplace of ideas may 
actually have less power to limit speech than other institutions do.195 
Their “special” First Amendment status can be more of a burden 
than a boon. In State v. Schmid,196 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
reversed the convictions of two Labor Party members who had been 
arrested for distributing political material on the Princeton University 
campus without prior authorization from the university.197 
Commenting on the case, Sanford Levinson noted that Princeton 
essentially lost “only because it is otherwise such an admirable 
institution in terms of its own commitment to the values of liberal 
democracy.”198 Such results might theoretically disincentivize the 
endorsement of speech-protecting institutions. But what such cases 
really highlight is not that speech institutions have less power than 
other institutions to regulate speech, but rather that they must justify 
their restrictions on speech according to how they advance the 
marketplace of ideas. As explained in Part III.B, universities (and, to 
an even greater degree, K-12 schools) actually retain broad discretion 
to limit speech on campus. But in keeping with academia’s 
marketplace-of-ideas-enhancing mission, these restrictions must be 
justified as academic judgments that will ultimately improve the 
market. 
In summary, courts should (and generally do) defer to market-
enhancing institutional rules when those rules are fairly applied by 
the institutions or organizations that developed them.199 
 
 195. Of course, the same might be said of public forum doctrine, because it strictly limits 
government power over speech in forums which the state has opened for speech. See Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–68 (1981). 
 196. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980). 
 197. Id. at 616, 633. 
 198. Sanford Levinson, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Access to Private Property 
Under State Constitutional Law, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 51, 59 
(1985). 
 199. For a “strictly pragmatic” version of this approach, see Katz, supra note 79, at 1752 
(“[I]f public policymakers have good reason to think that a given private norm is efficient, based 
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Differentiating between good and bad speech institutions and 
organizations is a tall order, one that demands an underlying theory 
of free expression that allows for such sorting.200 This is what the New 
Institutional First Amendment offers, by tying institutional free 
speech analysis to the marketplace of ideas metaphor that has guided 
free speech jurisprudence for so long. Deference to institutional 
norms does not commit lawyers or courts to the status quo, nor does 
it prevent them from pressing for change; it simply presents them with 
a different set of tools with which to do so.201 The final Part of this 
Article suggests how those tools might be usefully applied to certain 
oft-recognized speech institutions. 
III.  APPLYING THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. Morse Code: The Supreme Court’s Nuanced Endorsement of the 
New Institutional First Amendment in Schoolhouse Speech Cases 
In June 2007, the Supreme Court handed down Morse v. 
Frederick,202 the fourth major school speech case it has ever decided.203 
The splintered Court ruled that a high school principal did not violate 
the First Amendment by confiscating a banner reading “BONG HiTS 
 
on their own independent analysis, they should defer to it, and if they have good reason to think 
it inefficient, they should not defer.”). 
 200. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1657–66 (considering different possibilities for 
differentiating between speech institutions). 
 201. The most important way is by pushing for change in institutional norms, not just formal 
laws. Katz, supra note 79, at 1757 (“[W]e could argue within the private communities to which 
we belong in favor of more efficient and effective norms—writing op-ed pieces, attending 
neighborhood meetings, serving on volunteer committees, and the like—the very work that in 
previous generations helped make lawyers the leaders of their communities.”). 
 202. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
 203. The first three were Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 
U.S. 503 (1969), Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), and Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). I do not include cases such as West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which involved speech on school 
grounds but did not rest squarely on a theory of school speech. I note, however, that even those 
cases tangentially reaching the school speech question have tended to support the institutional 
view. See Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2495–96 
(2007) (holding that a high school sports association could prohibit high school coaches from 
recruiting middle school athletes in part because the association needed to do so to manage the 
league); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment limits 
schools’ power to remove books from library shelves); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 820 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that, despite student election candidates’ free speech right to campaign 
spending, a state university may impose a dollar limit on spending because “educational 
interests outweigh the free speech interests of the students”). 
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4 JESUS” and disciplining a student who refused to take it down 
himself.204 Although its holding seems limited, Morse’s reasoning 
confirms the descriptive and predictive validity of the New 
Institutional First Amendment. 
Deference to speech institutions’ internal norms is dependent on 
the degree to which those institutions advance the marketplace of 
ideas. This inquiry cannot be answered solely by reference to law. It is 
in many ways—to invoke another of Holmes’s famous dicta—a 
question of “experience” rather than “logic.”205 Experience has 
proven that schools enhance the marketplace of ideas and that they 
must occasionally limit student speech to do so. The education that 
schools impart doubtless improves students’ ability to participate in, 
and contribute to, the marketplace of ideas. But to educate, schools 
must often impose rules on students, especially younger ones, who are 
still on their way to becoming fully functional buyers and sellers of 
ideas. Indeed, the importance of schools’ internal regulation has been 
recognized for at least as long as the marketplace of ideas metaphor 
has been employed. John Stuart Mill, whose marketplace-like 
conception of free speech was a close cousin of Milton’s and an 
ancestor of Holmes’s, explicitly excluded children from the market: 
“It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to 
apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are 
not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the 
law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood.”206 Writing more 
recently, Bruce Hafen explicitly connected the marketplace metaphor 
to schools’ need to control students to prepare them to participate in 
that market: 
In a public school, the marketplace of ideas cannot be controlled by 
judges as a practical matter, nor can it be controlled by students as a 
matter of personal maturity; therefore, if faculty and administrators 
lack the discretion to control it, there is little meaningful 
marketplace at all—neither in the school nor in the public square of 
the future.207 
 
 204. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622. 
 205. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not 
been logic: it has been experience.”). 
 206. MILL, supra note 24, at 135–36. 
 207. Hafen, supra note 6, at 706. Of course, support for schools’ authority to limit speech is 
not universal. See Hafen, supra note 8, at 689 (“Many have concluded that a high school really is 
a public forum in which the adult ‘marketplace of ideas’ concept holds full sway.”). 
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Deference to schools’ regulation of student speech is thus well in line 
with popular and academic understandings of the purpose of schools. 
In keeping with this shared understanding—and vindicating the 
New Institutional First Amendment—the Supreme Court has long 
treated K-12 schools as special speech institutions.208 The Court’s 
schoolhouse speech cases—beginning with Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District 209 and continuing through 
Morse—demonstrate the Court’s attempt to balance students’ First 
Amendment rights (which undoubtedly follow them into school every 
day) with schools’ need to prepare those students to participate in the 
marketplace of ideas. These cases are tied together by the notion, 
voiced by Justice Stewart in Ginsberg v. New York,210 that “a child . . . 
is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the 
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”211 
In Tinker, the Court famously held that “[n]either students [n]or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”212 Professor Schauer reads this 
passage as “reaffirm[ing] the general presumption that First 
Amendment rights do not vary substantially with institutional 
setting.”213 But Tinker is entirely consistent with the New Institutional 
First Amendment. The Court’s decision could be read as giving 
schools power only to limit personal intercommunication that is 
unrelated to “the work of the schools,”214 or as holding that even 
personal intercommunication is protected unless it “materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others.”215 Either reading, however, vindicates the notion that 
the schools’ power over student speech is coextensive with the 
schools’ institutional mission—education and the spread of ideas—
 
 208. See Hafen, supra note 6, at 718 (“In this sense, a school is unlike any other arm of the 
federal or state governments, because non-educational institutions have fundamentally different 
purposes and functions.”). 
 209. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 210. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
 211. Id. at 649–50 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 212. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 213. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1263. 
 214. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
 215. Id. at 513. 
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which is what justifies schools’ unique First Amendment treatment in 
the first place.216 
Moreover, the Court’s later school speech cases—all of which 
have upheld restrictions on student speech—have demonstrated an 
increasing institutional awareness. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser,217 a student was suspended after delivering a sexually 
suggestive speech at a high school assembly.218 Upholding the 
suspension and the school’s authority to determine “what manner of 
speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate,”219 the 
Court clarified that even though the First Amendment did apply to 
students in public schools, their free speech rights “are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings.”220 Specifically, Fraser held that a school need not tolerate 
student speech that “would undermine the school’s basic educational 
mission.”221 The decision was thus attuned to the institutional needs of 
schools, upholding their authority to impose restrictions on student 
speech that interferes with the school’s ability to perform its 
institutional function—to educate, and thus to advance the 
marketplace of ideas. 
Two years later, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 222 
elaborated and clarified Tinker and Fraser. In Hazelwood, a high 
school principal removed two controversial articles from the school 
newspaper on the grounds that the students who wrote them had not 
mastered certain requirements of the journalism curriculum, and that 
the articles would threaten both the privacy of other students and the 
legal, moral, and ethical obligations of the writers.223 The Court found 
that “we cannot reject as unreasonable Principal Reynolds’s 
conclusion that neither the pregnancy article nor the divorce article 
 
 216. See id. at 507 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the 
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”). 
 217. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 218. Id. at 677–78. 
 219. Id. at 683. 
 220. Id. at 682. 
 221. Id. at 685; see also Hafen, supra note 8, at 693 (“The Court’s analysis suggests that the 
Hazelwood standard involves two stages of inquiry: courts must first ask whether the student 
expression at issue occurs in a context that implicates the school’s educational mission and must 
then ask whether the educator’s decision has a rational—but not necessarily an explicitly 
educational—basis.”). 
 222. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 223. Id. at 276. 
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was suitable for publication.” and that “no violation of First 
Amendment rights occurred.”224 In other words, the Court applied a 
kind of reasonableness review—highlighting the “standard of review” 
question225—to a school’s (organization’s) interpretation of its own 
curricular (institutional) norms. The First Amendment protects 
student speech “only when the decision to censor . . . student 
expression has no valid educational purpose.”226 Sounding like an NIE 
theorist arguing for government deference to preexisting economic 
institutions, Justice White observed that “the education of the 
Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and 
state and local school officials, and not of federal judges.”227 
Tinker established that the First Amendment applies in schools, 
but Fraser and Hazelwood clarified that high school principals could 
limit student speech when that speech would interfere with the 
schools’ educational (institutional) goals.228 Read together, these three 
cases support the New Institutional First Amendment conclusion, 
explicitly confirmed by the Court in Hazelwood, that “schools as well 
as courts can advance and protect the values of the first 
amendment.”229 
Morse continues this general trend, upholding the power of 
schools to limit student speech while justifying those restrictions 
(albeit not explicitly) in the name of schools’ special role in the 
marketplace of ideas. In Morse, the Court upheld the power of 
schools to limit speech that reasonably appears to encourage illegal 
drug use, but protected students’ free speech right to advocate 
decriminalization or any other “idea” that might contribute to the 
marketplace.230 Justice Alito’s controlling concurrence, joined by 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. See supra Part II.B.3 
 226. Id. at 273 (emphasis added). 
 227. Id. 
 228. The distinction between acceptable and unacceptable speech restrictions may track the 
line between topics on which the schools themselves can have a legitimate “speech” interest. 
Thus restrictions on speech about drugs and sex pass muster, but not restrictions on speech 
about the Vietnam War. I leave aside this point—which I thank Scott Moss for bringing to my 
attention—only because I believe it raises thorny issues about the difference between content- 
and viewpoint-based restrictions and the role of institutions as speakers. See generally Randall 
P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735 (1995) (arguing that only useful 
institutional speech should receive First Amendment protection). I hope to address these 
important complications in future work. 
 229. Hafen, supra note 8, at 685. 
 230. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring). 
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Justice Kennedy, clarifies the limited holding of the case, while 
effectively justifying it by reference to the marketplace of ideas: 
  I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (a) it 
goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech 
that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug 
use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of speech that 
can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social 
issue, including speech on issues such as “the wisdom of the war on 
drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.”231 
Chief Justice Roberts’s putative majority opinion strikes a similar 
tone, citing passages from Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and other cases 
to stress the “special characteristics of the school environment.”232 
Indeed, all four of the opinions in Morse that reached the First 
Amendment question233 highlighted the institutional role of schools, 
albeit drawing different conclusions about what that role allowed or 
required.234 Justice Alito announced that “public schools are 
invaluable and beneficent institutions,”235 and that speech restrictions 
within them must be (and can be) “based on some special 
characteristic of the school setting.”236 He found that the school’s 
responsibility to keep students safe from drugs was just such a 
characteristic.237 Although the majority opinion gave more rhetorical 
support to the school’s position, it too was based on a concern for 
student safety and refused to endorse a rule that would allow schools 
to restrict student speech based solely on its offensiveness: “After all, 
much political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 2621 (majority opinion) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 
266 (1988) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969))). 
 233. Justice Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part, did not fully reach the First 
Amendment question, and would have resolved the case on qualified immunity grounds. Morse, 
127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 234. Interestingly for the marketplace metaphor, there seemed to be some debate within the 
Court—and even within Justice Roberts’s own opinion—as to whether Frederick’s sign was 
intended to convey any idea at all. Compare id. at 2624 (majority opinion) (“Frederick himself 
claimed ‘that the words were just nonsense meant to attract television cameras.’”), and id. at 
2625 (“[N]ot even Frederick argues that the banner conveys any sort of political or religious 
message.”), with id. (“At least two interpretations of the words on the banner demonstrate that 
the sign advocated the use of illegal drugs.”). 
 235. Id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 236. Id. at 2638. 
 237. Id. 
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some.”238 Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, expressed his 
belief that Tinker and its progeny should be overruled, and that the 
First Amendment simply does not apply to student speech in 
schools.239 Arguing for an even stronger level of institutional 
deference than advocated in this Article, Justice Thomas wrote that 
“[l]ocal school boards, not the courts, should determine what 
pedagogical interests are ‘legitimate’ and what rules ‘reasonably 
relat[e]’ to those interests.”240 At the other end of the spectrum, 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, objected that 
“[t]o the extent the Court defers to the principal’s ostensibly 
reasonable judgment, it abdicates its constitutional responsibility.”241 
Although Justice Stevens allowed that student speech is proscribable 
if it “violates a permissible rule []or expressly advocates conduct that 
is illegal and harmful to students,”242 he expressly declined to defer to 
the principal’s interpretation of those rules:243 “The beliefs of third 
parties, reasonable or otherwise, have never dictated which messages 
amount to proscribable advocacy.”244 But Justice Stevens’s dissent 
only highlighted what the majority, drawing on Tinker, Fraser, and 
Hazelwood, had decided: That schools are entitled to deference in 
choosing and applying rules designed to protect their institutional 
missions. The opinions of the Court—Chief Justice Roberts’s 
majority and Justice Alito’s controlling concurrence—thus support 
the New Institutional First Amendment described here. 
 
 238. Id. at 2629 (majority opinion). 
 239. Id. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 240. Id. at 2636 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)); see 
also id. at 2631 (“In short, in the earliest public schools, teachers taught, and students listened. 
Teachers commanded, and students obeyed. Teachers did not rely solely on the power of ideas 
to persuade; they relied on discipline to maintain order.”). Thomas is not alone in this view. See 
Stanley Fish, Think Again—Clarence Thomas Is Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2007, http://fish. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/clarence-thomas-is-right (claiming that the First Amendment 
should not apply to students or teachers because education occurs in a different context than 
democracy). 
 241. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2647 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 242. Id. at 2644. 
 243. Id. at 2647. Interestingly, the school district’s written rule governing student speech 
was, in Justice Stevens’s assessment, “otherwise quite tolerant of non-disruptive student 
speech.” Id. at 2646. The rule reads in part: “Students will not be disturbed in the exercise of 
their constitutionally guaranteed rights to assemble peaceably and to express ideas and 
opinions, privately or publicly, provided that their activities do not infringe on the rights of 
others and do not interfere with the operation of the educational program.” Id. (quoting the 
school’s written rule). 
 244. Id. at 2647. 
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In 1987, Bruce Hafen noted that “the Supreme Court has begun 
quietly—almost as a series of asides—to consider the place of an 
educational institution, qua institution, within first amendment 
theory.”245 Morse furthers that project, demonstrating the Court’s 
attention to schools as unique speech institutions with their own 
marketplace-enhancing internal norms. The New Institutional First 
Amendment both describes and justifies this treatment of 
schoolhouse speech while relieving some of the apparent tension 
between students’ right to speak and educators’ need to occasionally 
restrict that speech in order to teach them.246 Best of all, the New 
Institutional First Amendment does this by reference to one of the 
First Amendment’s first principles—the advancement of the 
marketplace of ideas.247 
B. Universities as Speech Institutions 
The institutional needs and norms that justify the Court’s 
deference to K-12 schools’ internal regulation of student speech do 
not apply with equal force to universities, even though universities 
are undoubtedly “speech institutions.” Although schools and 
universities both advance the marketplace of ideas, they do so in 
different ways and demand (and deserve) different levels of 
institutional deference. And just as the New Institutional First 
Amendment would predict, courts hold universities to a different 
standard in light of their unique institutional norms. Thus high 
 
 245. Hafen, supra note 6, at 712 (citation omitted). 
 246. See id. at 665 (“The degree of authority required to teach children and to preserve an 
educational environment is fundamentally at odds with the anti-authoritarianism of the first 
amendment tradition, because education by definition involves the imposition of restraints.”). 
 247. See Hafen, supra note 8, at 698 (“The root question, which the typical first amendment 
model fails to address, is how to organize and operate schools in order to maximize their overall 
contribution to the values and purposes of the first amendment.”). 
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schools may impose restrictions on student248 and teacher249 speech 
that would not pass constitutional muster on a college campus.250 
Professor Schauer writes that “an institutional account of the 
First Amendment would not surprisingly recognize a special place for 
the country’s colleges and universities, whose historical and current 
mission is to play a central role in challenging conventional 
wisdom.”251 Explicitly tying universities to the marketplace of ideas 
metaphor, Justice Brennan wrote in Keyishian v. Board of Regents:252 
“The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s 
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that 
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of 
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’”253 
But who exactly is it that “challenges conventional wisdom,” to 
paraphrase Schauer? The university’s administration, which makes its 
rules? The student body? The faculty? Claiming a special role for 
“universities” as institutions is one thing—most First Amendment 
scholars, not to mention judges and the general public, would 
probably agree with that much. But the exact contours of that special 
treatment can be difficult and contentious when one disaggregates the 
institution. What happens if a university passes an internal rule saying 
that students cannot criticize the administration? Who gets special 
First Amendment treatment in that situation—the university 
administration, as the representative of the “speech institution”? Or 
 
 248. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988) (allowing the 
removal of student-written articles from a high school newspaper, when the articles may have 
violated other students’ privacy and may have been inappropriate subject matter for younger 
students); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (upholding a student’s 
suspension for delivering a lewd and suggestive speech at a school assembly). 
 249. Schauer, supra note 119, at 912 (“Existing lower court doctrine indicates that 
substantially more restrictions are permissible for primary and secondary school teachers than 
for those who are teaching at the college and university level.”). 
 250. Eule & Varat, supra note 169, at 1593 n.241 (“In a college setting, of course, the 
protection afforded pupil speech more closely approximates full-citizen speech rights than that 
conferred on students in the secondary schools.”). 
 251. Schauer, supra note 119, at 925; see also id. at 907 (“Most American constitutionalists—
who are also academics, to be sure—would agree that there is a constitutional right to academic 
freedom and would agree that the right exists in, around, or at least near, the First 
Amendment.”). See generally Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461 
(2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s affirmative action cases can be read as institutionally 
aware First Amendment decisions). 
 252. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 253. Id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 
1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)). 
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would that be a situation in which “the tie goes to the speaker, not the 
censor”?254 As the analysis throughout this Article has demonstrated, 
deferring to institutions based on their contribution to the 
marketplace of ideas means considering not just the speech they 
produce, but the speech they suppress.255 
This much, at least, seems clear: Unlike K-12 schools, 
universities’ First Amendment function—their contribution to the 
efficiency of the marketplace of ideas—does not require or justify 
extensive internal speech regulations. To effectively educate young 
students, K-12 schools must commonly restrict speech. This tension, 
and society’s acceptance of it, is justified by the fact that young 
students are not fully equipped to be active participants in the 
marketplace of ideas. The very purpose of schools is to prepare them 
for that role. Universities, by contrast, have a student body made up 
of young adults who are trusted—and in American culture, 
expected—to challenge ideas and question authority. They are better 
equipped than they were as K-12 students to participate in the 
marketplace of ideas. As a result, restrictions on their speech are less 
likely to be marketplace enhancing. 
This does not mean, however, that universities have no power to 
limit speech through the imposition of institutional norms. Although 
they cannot resort as easily as K-12 schools to the discipline-and-
order justification, universities are just as—if not more—entitled to 
claim that their decisions to restrict or enable speech are made in the 
interest of advancing the pursuit of knowledge and truth. And when 
those claims are genuine, they should be—and generally have been—
respected. This is true even when the universities’ institutional 
interests conflict with those of individual students or professors, as 
they inevitably do.256 But even when those individuals claim that their 
speech acts are academic, and thus contribute to the marketplace of 
ideas, universities’ decisions to limit their speech can be academic 
 
 254. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2007) (“Where the First 
Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.”). 
 255. Cf. Matthew W. Finkin, On “Institutional” Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 
825 (1983) (“[I]nstitutional autonomy was perceived as an integral element of the theory of 
academic freedom and played an important role in making German institutions among the 
intellectually freest in the world.”). 
 256. Schauer, supra note 119, at 919 (“[T]here is no avoiding the conflict between a view of 
academic freedom that views individual academics as its primary and direct beneficiaries, and a 
contrasting view that locates the right in academic institutions, even if doing so limits the 
individual rights of the employees of those institutions.”). 
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judgments as well.257 To the degree that a university’s decision can be 
justified as marketplace enhancing, courts are likely to defer to it. In 
Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing,258 for example, the 
Court upheld the University of Michigan’s dismissal of a student for 
academic reasons, citing the “academic freedom” of “state and local 
educational institution.”259 Justice Stevens explained that “[a]cademic 
freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited 
exchange of ideas among teachers and students but also, and 
somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the 
academy itself.”260 The Court refused to override “the faculty’s 
professional judgment” unless it was “such a substantial departure 
from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or 
committee responsible did not actually exercise professional 
judgment.”261 
Universities are thus entitled to institutional deference when it 
comes to speech regulations that improve, not limit, the free flow of 
information and ideas. For example, controversial speakers are often 
allowed to speak only at certain times and places—on the quad, for 
example, or in an auditorium, but not in the classroom of their 
choosing. In addition to being reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions,262 such regulations can be justified on the simple ground 
that the would-be speaker’s contribution to the marketplace of ideas 
would not outweigh the overall cost to the marketplace caused by 
disrupting classes or the library.263 Put another way, a rule that 
 
 257. See id. at 920. 
 258. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985). 
 259. Id. at 226; see also Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 88–90 
(1978) (deferring to university’s academic judgment in due process cases). 
 260. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12 (citations omitted). 
 261. Id. at 225. 
 262. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“Our cases make clear, 
however, that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the 
time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.’” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. 288, 293 (1984))). 
 263. The university might also argue, of course, that its decision to cancel the speech is itself 
an act of speech, because the controversial lecture would inevitably carry the university’s 
imprimatur. The Supreme Court, after all, has recognized that there is no constitutionally 
significant difference between the right to speak and the right to remain silent. See, e.g., W. Va. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
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prohibits controversial speakers from delivering speeches in the 
library or in classrooms actually enhances the marketplace of ideas, 
because it protects students’ ability to learn. 
When universities impose internal restrictions on speech that are 
not marketplace enhancing, however, their institutional commitment 
to free speech may actually limit their power under the First 
Amendment. In State v. Schmid, the Princeton case discussed in Part 
II.B.4,264 the court seemed to base its decision on the fact that 
“Princeton . . . clearly seeks to encourage both a wide and continuous 
exchange of opinions and ideas and to foster a policy of openness and 
freedom with respect to the use of its facilities.”265 The Schmid court 
thus determined that the university’s attempt to impose speech 
restrictions could not be justified as an academic decision intended to 
perfect the marketplace of ideas. 
A more difficult question would have arisen if the issue were 
framed as a purely academic dispute. Consider the hypothetical 
situation of a young literature professor who believes, contrary to 
accepted wisdom, that Lord Byron was not part of the British 
Romantic movement and refuses to teach his work in a romance 
literature class, much to the consternation of the department 
chairman. Backed by the university’s administration, the chairman 
argues that the romance literature class is the only one in which 
Byron can be taught, and that literature students must learn Byron to 
succeed as scholars. The young professor refuses to budge and is 
eventually disciplined by the university. Invoking the First 
Amendment, the professor claims that the punishment violates the 
right to free speech. The university responds that its own decision is 
purely academic, based on its desire to prepare students for 
participation in the marketplace of ideas.266 The case is assigned to a 
 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.”). But see Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst. 
Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1311–13 (2006) (rejecting universities’ First Amendment freedom of 
association claims). 
 264. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. 
 265. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 631 (N.J. 1980). 
 266. In keeping with the New Institutional First Amendment, the university’s academic 
motivation would be of primary importance, and would differentiate this hypothetical from a 
case in which a university tried to avoid bad press by preventing a controversial professor from 
“speaking” on its behalf. See Ryan J. Foley, Letter Warned Barrett to Stop Seeking Publicity, 
CAMPUS WATCH, Aug. 3, 2006, http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/2671 (reporting the 
university provost’s declaration that “[w]e cannot allow political pressure from critics of 
unpopular ideas to inhibit the free exchange of ideas” but that the provost had also told a 
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judge who has read a fascinating and convincing law review article 
about the New Institutional First Amendment, which the judge 
intends to apply faithfully. Should the judge defer to the university’s 
decision to sanction the professor, or does the professor’s individual 
academic freedom win out? Both sides, after all, have invoked norms 
that would seem to improve the marketplace of ideas.267 
According to New Institutional First Amendment theory, the 
university should probably prevail. To fulfill their role in advancing 
and improving the marketplace of ideas, universities must have power 
to control how students are taught. Their institutional norms are 
entitled to—and generally receive—deference from courts, at least 
when those norms serve the role that justifies universities’ special 
treatment in the first place. Decisions about curriculum are precisely 
the kind of institutional regulations that universities are entrusted to 
make in the name of the marketplace of ideas. Faced with the choice 
between one honest academic decision (the university’s) and another 
(the professor’s), courts should—and likely will—defer to the 
organization’s interpretation of the institutional rule. 
In Julian Eule and Jonathan Varat’s words, “[T]he university is a 
community in which robust traditions of open discourse and tolerance 
for competing ideas predate efforts to summon constitutional 
canons.”268 Such paeans to the speech-enhancing role of universities 
tend to cast universities as special speakers, and they undoubtedly do 
play that role. But the flip side of institutional autonomy is deference 
to the role of universities as regulators of speech. Universities are 
rightly treated as particularly important managers of, and actors in, 
the marketplace of ideas. But when universities act contrary to these 
“robust traditions” by limiting speech in ways not likely to improve 
the marketplace of ideas, courts are unlikely to defer, nor should 
they. 
 
controversial professor that he must be careful not to suggest “that you speak for the 
university”). 
 267. Eule & Varat, supra note 169, at 1557 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), for failing to explore “the possibility that First 
Amendment rights lay on both sides of the private dispute”); Sullivan, supra note 8, at 1654 
(“[W]hen government attempts to restrict the power of private intermediaries to restrict speech, 
there usually are free speech interests on both sides.”). 
 268. Eule & Varat, supra note 169, at 1574–75 (citation omitted). 
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C. Commercial Speech: The Marketplace Metaphor in the Real-
World Market 
Given this Article’s focus on marketplaces and institutional 
economics, there can be no better place to conclude than with a 
consideration of commercial speech, the arena where the marketplace 
of ideas most clearly overlaps with the real-world market. In his 
dissenting opinion in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. New 
York Public Services Commission,269 the case that established the 
contemporary test for restrictions on commercial speech, Justice 
Rehnquist suggested that there was no principled distinction between 
the marketplace of goods and the marketplace of ideas.270 This Section 
concludes that the New Institutional First Amendment may support 
Justice Rehnquist’s view and may also cast light on both the 
relationship between the real-world marketplace and the marketplace 
of ideas on the one hand, and on the past, present, and future of 
commercial speech doctrine on the other. 
Prior to 1976’s Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council,271 commercial speech received no 
constitutional protection and could be regulated more or less at the 
government’s discretion. For current purposes, the most interesting 
critic of this approach was none other than Ronald Coase. In two 
articles written in the 1970s, Coase highlighted the unequal 
intellectual positions occupied by the market for ideas and the market 
for goods.272 Turning to the intersection of the two, Coase argued that 
“[a]dvertising, the dissemination of messages about the goods and 
services which people consume, is clearly part of the market for ideas. 
Intellectuals have not, in general, welcomed this other occupant of 
their domain.”273 He concluded one of his articles with a discussion of 
then-current cases,274 including a district court case from Virginia 
 
 269. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 270. Id. at 592–94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 271. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 272. See Coase, supra note 5, at 1–2; Coase, The Market for Goods, supra note 64, at 384; see 
also supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text; cf. Director, supra note 22, at 3 (“The free 
market as a desirable method of organizing the intellectual life of the community was urged 
long before it was advocated as a desirable method of organizing its economic life.”). 
 273. Coase, supra note 5, at 8–9. 
 274. Id. at 29–31. 
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called Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Board of 
Pharmacy,275 and a prediction: 
It would seem probable that these decisions do not define the outer 
bounds of the applicability of the First Amendment to advertising 
but merely mark a stage in a gradual expansion of the kinds of 
commercial speech which will be brought within the protection of 
the First Amendment by the courts.276 
In this, as in so many other things, Coase was right. The very 
district court case he cited made its way to the Supreme Court, where 
Justice Blackmun took the opportunity to rule, for the first time 
clearly, that commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment 
protection: “What is at issue is whether a State may completely 
suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about 
entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s effect upon its 
disseminators and its recipients. Reserving other questions, we 
conclude that the answer to this one is in the negative.”277 
Harkening back to Justice Holmes’s marketplace metaphor, 
Justice Blackmun wrote that “society also may have a strong interest 
in the free flow of commercial information.”278 He then held that 
“speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial 
transaction’” is not “so removed from any ‘exposition of ideas,’ and 
from ‘truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of 
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government’” that it 
should be completely without protection.279 
But what Justice Blackmun did not create, and what commercial 
speech doctrine still lacks, is a comprehensive definition of what 
counts as “commercial speech.” Rather than drawing clear 
boundaries, the Supreme Court has relied on “various descriptions, 
indicia, and disclaimers without settling upon a precise and 
 
 275. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. 
Va. 1974), aff’d, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 276. Coase, supra note 5, at 31–32. 
 277. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976) 
(footnote omitted). In an addendum to his article, Professor Coase acknowledged that Virginia 
State Board had confirmed his view, and offered another prediction, one which has not yet 
proven itself: “Now that it has been decided that commercial speech is covered by the First 
Amendment, consideration of the limits of its application, the inevitable ‘balancing,’ can 
proceed in a sensible manner, a process in which the studies by economists of the effects of 
advertising may be expected to play a useful role.” Coase, supra note 5, at 33–34. 
 278. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764. 
 279. Id. at 762 (citations omitted). 
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comprehensive definition.”280 In part, the Court’s hesitance to 
establish a single firm definition reflects the fact that advertising and 
other forms of commercial speech have become increasingly difficult 
to recognize in practice. Indeed, viewers of many modern 
advertisements may have a difficult time discerning what product or 
service is being offered, or how it relates to the ad they have seen. 
Thus, unlike the school and university examples discussed in Sections 
A and B—both of which admit of reasonably straightforward 
definition—discussions of commercial speech are plagued by the 
difficulty of identifying commercial activity in the first place. 
The New Institutional First Amendment does not offer a simple 
solution, but it does have a clear diagnosis: the primary problem with 
commercial speech doctrine is the lack of an institutional identity. 
Commercial speech is difficult to define precisely because, to a far 
greater degree than universities, “commercial speakers” do not 
comprise a readily identifiable institution. Is “business” an 
institution? What of noncommercial speakers—such as universities or 
the government—who occasionally engage in commercial acts? 
Answering those questions only leads to a second-order but equally 
important question: is “business” the kind of speech institution that is 
entitled to First Amendment protection—that is, does it advance the 
free flow of ideas in the marketplace of ideas? These are difficult 
questions for which the New Institutional First Amendment—like 
contemporary commercial speech doctrine—does not provide easy 
answers. 
Nevertheless, elements of the New Institutional First 
Amendment could easily be incorporated into current commercial 
speech doctrine, and may help lead to a better definition of the 
category itself. Despite lacking a firm definition of “commercial 
speech,” in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service 
Commission, the Court established a four-prong test that grants 
commercial speech (whatever it is) a sort of intermediate level of 
protection.281 Some parts of Central Hudson’s test already reflect the 
Holmesian marketplace model, and could easily accommodate a 
greater institutional focus. The first prong, for example, which asks 
 
 280. Piety, supra note 187, at 381; Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of 
Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 56 (1999). 
 281. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
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whether the speech involved is false or misleading,282 fits well with the 
New Institutional First Amendment approach. Speech that is false or 
misleading can hardly be said to contribute to the marketplace of 
ideas, and institutional or organizational speakers that deliver such 
speech do not contribute to the marketplace. The Court has 
“concluded that all ideas, but only accurate statements of fact, further 
self-government,”283 and Central Hudson itself said that the 
government had the power to “ban forms of communication more 
likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”284 The second and third 
prongs assess “whether the asserted governmental interest is 
substantial”285 and “whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted.”286 These inquiries would remain the 
same under an institutional approach. Similarly, the fourth prong of 
the Central Hudson test—that measuring overbreadth287—could 
relatively easily be transformed into an inquiry about the boundaries 
of the institution whose speech acts are at issue. Under this reading, 
an overbroad restriction on speech would be one that impermissibly 
cut across institutional boundaries, limiting the speech of “good” 
institutions as well as “bad.” 
Whether these modifications of the Central Hudson test would 
appreciably advance the search for a coherent commercial speech 
doctrine is a question demanding more analysis than can be afforded 
here.288 Some complications are immediately evident. For one thing, 
 
 282. Id. at 566. See also Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 496 (1982) 
(holding that the government may entirely ban commercial speech that proposes illegal 
transactions); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1979) (upholding a statute prohibiting the 
practice of optometry under misleading names); see also Jeffrey Lefstin, Note, Does the First 
Amendment Bar Cancellation of REDSKINS?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 665, 674–75 (2000) (discussing 
Friedman in the context of whether the Washington Redskins’ trademark constitutes 
commercial speech). 
 283. Ingber, supra note 7, at 14 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 340–41 
(1974); Ocala-Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971) (White, J., concurring); 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 405 n.2 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)). 
 284. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. 
 285. Id. at 566. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. The Court has signaled that it may be considering a move to an entirely new framework 
of analysis. As discussed in Part II.B.4, the Court in 2003 granted certiorari in a widely watched 
case, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003), which offered an opportunity to revisit and clarify 
both the definition of commercial speech and its governing standard. See Goldstein, supra note 
184, at 70–72. But to the disappointment of First Amendment scholars, id. at 63-64, the Court—
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First Amendment questions arise on somewhat different footing in 
the commercial context than in academic contexts. The major 
question in school and university cases is generally whether the 
academic institution (or organization) can internally regulate 
individual speech, whereas in the commercial speech cases the 
question is usually whether the government (or even another 
institution) can regulate the speech of the commercial institution or 
organization. 
Suffice to say, the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine 
has evolved in fits and starts. But despite ups and downs, the trend 
has been to accord increasing protection to “commercial” speech, 
both by applying the governing Central Hudson test more strictly and 
by classifying less and less speech as commercial in the first place. It is 
possible to fit both of these two trends—a contracting category of 
commercial speech and an expanding protection for the speech within 
it—into the New Institutional First Amendment framework. To 
reconceptualize in terms of that framework, one might say that the 
Court has come to accept Professor Coase’s view that commercial 
speech “is clearly part of the market for ideas,”289 and perhaps that the 
institutions and organizations who deliver it are entitled to special 
First Amendment treatment. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the power it has exercised over free speech theory since 
Abrams, the marketplace of ideas metaphor has done little to keep 
pace with changes in economic theory. Although criticisms of the 
marketplace of ideas metaphor have mirrored—and in many 
instances explicitly adopted—criticisms of the neoclassical view of a 
perfectly efficient economic market, defenders of the metaphor have 
not yet responded—as their economist counterparts have—by 
adopting a view of the “marketplace” that takes into account the 
existence of transaction costs and the institutions that mediate them. 
The New Institutional First Amendment described here attempts to 
do just that. In essence, it argues that if the marketplace of ideas is the 
animating purpose of the First Amendment, it can be served by 
institutions as well as by individuals. 
 
over two written dissents—later dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted. Kasky, 539 U.S. 
at 655 (2003) (majority opinion); id. at 665 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 289. Coase, supra note 5, at 8. 
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But there is another bit of internecine conflict the New 
Institutional First Amendment could help resolve: the discord among 
the First Amendment’s doctrinal categories. These familiar 
categories—commercial speech, government speech, schoolhouse 
speech, and so on—increasingly overlap with one another and lack 
any intrinsic meaning.290 The institutions that originally gave rise to 
these categories no longer limit themselves to the roles with which 
they are traditionally associated and which the doctrines arose to 
address. Schools and government units, for example, increasingly 
enter into naming rights deals with commercial sponsors.291 How 
should such speech acts be defined, and what level of First 
Amendment protection should they receive? Are they commercial 
speech, government speech, the school’s speech, or something else 
entirely? And what principle justifies the result? 
The New Institutional First Amendment helps to resolve these 
and other difficulties, by dusting off and partially rehabilitating the 
marketplace metaphor that has animated First Amendment 
jurisprudence since at least 1919, albeit with increasing shakiness. 
Differentiating between speech institutions may not always be an 
easy task, but it is no more difficult—and is quite a bit more useful—
than the line-drawing courts must attempt under the contemporary 
“categorization” approach. 
The New Institutional First Amendment is not simply 
explanatory; it is also predictive and normative. As such, its vitality 
will be tested by the increasing number of “speech institutions” 
demanding the Court’s attention. In addition to the thorny problem 
of commercial speech, which may well be the next big thing in First 
Amendment law,292 many of the Court’s looming First Amendment 
issues—copyright,293 scientific speech, and speech in the electoral 
sphere,294 for example—would benefit from the institutional approach. 
Online speech presents perhaps the most interesting challenge, as the 
internet replaces the traditional press (long regarded as a prototypical 
 
 290. See generally Blocher, supra note 179 (arguing that the First Amendment categories of 
government speech, commercial speech, and schoolhouse speech have collapsed upon each 
other). 
 291. Id. at 6–16. 
 292. See supra notes 183–91 and accompanying text. 
 293. See Schauer, supra note 124, at 1799. 
 294. Schauer, supra note 121, at 92 n.42 (citing C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and 
Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 24–28 (1998)). 
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“speech institution”) as the dominant forum for public debate.295 The 
New Institutional First Amendment, unlike many free speech 
theories, is able to capture and explain the unique, exchange-
enhancing nature of the Internet and suggest why that special role 
might entitle it to special institutional treatment. 
As it becomes “increasingly possible and likely . . . that 
Americans can go about their daily lives without entering the public 
fora cordoned off for strong First Amendment protection,”296 private 
institutions’ regulation of speech has become increasingly important. 
The New Institutional First Amendment recognizes, as economists 
have for decades, that individuals create and live under an 
institutional regime. 
 
 295. SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRESS 
AND RESHAPING OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE 24–32, 135–51 (2007). 
 296. Note, Unsolicited Communications, supra note 21, at 1322; see also id. at 1328 (“The 
privatization of traditionally public space is a straightforward threat to the marketplace of 
ideas.”). 
